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A B ST R A C T
Disposal of high level nuclear waste has evoked m uch in terest among scientists, 
engineers and society a t large. Num erous schemes have been proposed in th is re­
gard and a  few have been analyzed thoroughly. However, these schemes have been 
found to  be valid only under very specific environm ental conditions, thus im posing 
constrain ts on the  schem e of disposal. The option of retrievability  im posed another 
constrain t. In addition  to  accom m odating the  constrain ts, the  disposal schem e m ust 
also com ply w ith federal regulations ( N R C  10 CFR P A R T  60, EPA 10 CFR P A R T  
191, D O E  10 CFR P A R T  960). D ue to  the longevity of radionuclide toxicity, the 
w aste containm ent design has to  sustain  its in tegrity  for a long tim e. T he possibility 
of a  change in the  environm ent m ust also be considered in the  design.
A system  (D E C ISIO N  T R E E )  was devised, which presented a  comprehensive analysis 
of the  proposed schemes. T his effort focuses on a few prom ising schemes, which were 
analyzed m ore thoroughly. These schemes were (1) nuclear waste disposal a t site, (2) 
nuclear waste disposal in  m ined  geological repositories contained in a single barrier 
canister and (3) nuclear waste contained in a  m ulti barrier canister. All schemes were 
analysed only through th e  period  of retrievability.
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C h ap ter 1 
In tro d u ctio n
1.1 O verview
N uclear waste m anagem ent is not a new issue, for it arose w ith the  advent of nuclear 
energy in the  1940’s. However, only in the  recent past has th e  m anagem ent of nuclear 
w aste becom e a m atte r  of great public concern. Ju s t a  few years ago, nuclear energy 
was considered to  be the  preferred a lternative  to  m eet the  energy requirem ents of 
hum an  civilization. T he toxicity  of radionuclide bearing  w aste was recognized, bu t 
was considered to  be a triv ial problem  whose solution could be postponed. W aste 
was m ostly  stored as liquid in tanks, bo th  above ground and underground. Due 
to  the  longevity of radionuclide toxicity these tanks were designed for containm ent 
ra th e r th an  disposal. T hey  were m eant to serve as an interface betw een final use as 
a  resource and  u ltim a te  disposal and were designed to  be  in terim . T he problem  in 
its  present s ta te  has assum ed more significance due to  the  sensitization of popular 
fears abou t rad iation , widely publicized reactor accidents, and leaks a t w aste storage 
sites. This can also be p a rtly  a ttr ib u ted  to  th e  need to  accom m odate burgeoning 
spen t fuel originating from the nuclear power industry. T he need to  seek a  feasible 
a lte rn a tiv e  to  term inally  store nuclear waste has becom e all the  m ore im p o rtan t for 
th e  sustenance of the nuclear fuel cycle.
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1.2 N uclear fuel cycle
N uclear fuel cycle is the generic term  for the  various support activities, essential to 
the  operation of nuclear fission reactors. Different types of processes, operations and 
the final waste form  exist w ithin the  fuel cycle, as depicted in fig. 1.1. These are clas­
sified as front end and back end processes, based on function. The first classification 
constitu tes processes which support fuel inpu t in to  the reactor, while the  ones which 
aid in reclaim ing and disposing the  rem ains of the irrad ia ted  fuel elem ents fall in to  
the  second classification. T he process of m ining na tu ra lly  occurring u ran ium  in itia tes 
the  nuclear fuel cycle. Mill processing of u ran ium  ore involves the  isolation of salts 
such as sodium  d iu rana te  and  am m onium  d iu ranate , thus producing a  m ateria l rich 
in u ran ium  oxides. T he processed u ran ium  is sub jected  to  a  process of conversion 
which alters it in to  a  form  su itab le  for enrichm ent. This concentration of U235 is 
achieved by e ither of two processes, a  wet process, which releases liquid effluents and 
a  dry  process, which em anates bo th  gaseous and solid wastes. T he choice of process 
has a significant im pact on th e  logistics of the  operation  of disposal. U ranium , as 
UFg is enriched by a  process te rm ed  Gaseous diffusion. A fter reduction, the  m etal is 
pelletized and sin tered  as ten  foot long stacks and  loaded into zircalloy seam less tubes 
to  form  fuel rods. T h is is the  term inal front end process. W astes released by this 
process, constitu te  b o th  solids and liquids con tam inated  w ith uranium  and flourides. 
These fuel rods are the  o u tp u t of the  front end processes and serve as an inpu t for 
the  th e  operation of th e  nuclear reactor. O peration  of th e  nuclear reactor releases 
neu tron  con tam inated  solid w aste and exhausted  fuel rods, term ed spent fuel. The 
la te r is stored in an in terim  containm ent facility  near the  reactor. T he  operation of 
storing spent fuel, in itia tes  th e  back end processes. Spent fuel, so stored is e ither 
reprocessed to  reclaim  unfissioned uranium  and fission p roduct p lu tonium  or stored 
un til a final deposition is achieved. If reprocessed, the  reclaim ed u ran ium  is feed into 
th e  front end, junction ing  a t th e  process of fuel enrichm ent, thus com pleting the  fuel 
cycle.
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NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
FRONT END BACK END
PROCESSING
MILLING
MINING
ENRICHING REPROCESSING
INTERIM STORAGE
FUEL FABRICATION INTERIM STORAGE
FEDERAL FINAL DISPOSITION
Figure 1.1: Schem atic of th e  N uclear Fuel Cycle, Source: Modified from
K R A U SK O P F , K. Radioactive waste disposal and geology, Ref[18]
In the  case of plu tonium , the  m erging junction  is the front end process of fuel fab­
rication. The storing of nuclear waste in an interim  facility, has been the term inal 
process for th e  fuel cycle. This practice is the  result of the  m andate  against the  inclu­
sion of the  operation of spent fuel reprocessing in the  fuel cycle of comm ercial power 
reactors. T his has continued in spite of lifting the  m oratorium  on the reprocessing 
of com m ercial spent fuel, because of unfavorable economics and uncertain ty  about 
fu tu re  nuclear policy. W astes generated by reprocessing are m ostly a ttr ib u ted  to  de­
fense operations, as they  are specifically designed to  produce plutonium . This goal 
m akes the  reclam ation of p lu tonium  from fuel elem ents irrad ia ted  in the  presence of 
lith ium  prim ary  to  their operation. M ost of th is waste is contained in in terim  storage 
facilities, aw aiting final disposal.
1.3 U rgency o f the need for u ltim ate disposal
Skepticism  is being expressed abou t the  urgency of term inally  storing radionuclide 
bearing waste. For one th ing, radionuclide toxicity  is a inverse function of tim e. This 
points to  the  fact th a t , waste handling would be easier after a few decades. Lower 
levels of rad ioactiv ity  and  relatively lower rates of heat em ission com plem ent th e  for­
m er. M oreover, the  tim e buffer th a t  would result out of p rocrastination , m ight bring 
abou t some technological advances which would m ake disposal bo th  safer and easier. 
One additional argum ent could be th e  perception of spent fuel as an energy resource 
due to  the presence of uran ium  and plutonium . Nuclear waste is also being viewed 
as an in teresting  m ateria l m etallurgically, since it  contains large am ounts of isotopes 
of relatively  rare  m etals like cesium , zirconium , technetium  and the  transu ran ic  ele­
m ents. R adioactiv ity  precludes th e ir separation and use a t present, b u t advances in 
technology m ight aid separation, m aking nuclear w aste a m ineral resource. If these 
argum ents are considered to  be strong enough, they would lead to  an in terim  storage 
facility, possibly s tu rd ier and m ore robust th an  the  present containm ent facilities.
1.4 W aste classification
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Radionuclide bearing waste can exist in all th ree  physical states. T he solid comes 
from sludge in storage tanks containing liquid solutions, mining and m illing of ura­
nium  and thorium  ores, and from  contam inated  equipm ent and structu res. T he liquid 
waste is released as aqueous w aste from the  first cycle extraction system  in spent fuel 
reprocessing p lan ts and as liquid discharge from  different parts of the  reactor p lant. 
T he gaseous waste comes from  gaseous effluents of reprocessing plants and nuclear 
power plants. M ore often th an  not, nuclear w aste is classified on th e  basis of the level 
of rad ioactiv ity  and th e  type  of m ateria l present. The general classification in m ost 
cases being as follows.
High Level W aste (HLW ): This is an aqueous waste. It is a  result of reprocessing 
spent fuel sourced from  com m ercial and defense power reactors. I t  m ain ly  consists of 
fission products and  a  sm all am ount of heavy isotopes, such as plutonium .
Spent Fuel (SF): T his comes ou t of a fission reacto r and is stored or fu rther processed 
for reclaim ing u ran ium . This form  of w aste is trea ted  as High Level W aste (HLW), 
unless and until, it  is retrieved  and reprocessed at a  fu tu re  tim e.
Transuranic W aste (TRU ): This is defined as a m ateria l th a t is con tam inated  w ith al­
pha  em itting  radionuclides of half lives g reater th an  20 years, atom ic num bers greater 
th an  91 and concentrations g reater than  100 nanocuries per gram . TR U  w aste clas­
sification does not include 23SP u  and 2i l P u .
Low Level Waste (LLW ): This is defined as th a t  waste m ateria l, which has had con­
ta c t w ith radioactive substances. It has a  relatively low rad ioactiv ity  and contains 
practically  no T R U  elem ents. M ost of th is w aste does no t require any shielding and 
m ay be buried in near surface facilities.
M ill Tailings-. This is a result of m ineral processing. It constitu tes a type of waste 
which is low in radioactivity. However, it differs from Low Level W aste (LLW) in 
th a t elem ents such as thorium  and radium  are present in th is form  of waste. They 
are usually collected as piles w ithin enclosures.
1.5 R ationale
In shear volum e, mill tailings, bo th  active and passive, account for m ost of the nuclear 
w aste inventory. High Level W aste (HLW) accounts for a  relatively  sm all percentage 
of the  waste generated. However, th e  criterion th a t governs the  logistics of handling 
various form s of nuclear waste is toxicity. As discussed earlier, HLW is m ore radioac­
tive and hence m ore toxic th an  m ill tailings. This one criterion  m akes i waging 
HLW bo th  technically  dem anding and challenging. HLW is a  p roduct of the back 
end processes of the  nuclear fuel cycle. This is the rationale  in  focusing this study  
on the  back end processes of the  nuclear fuel cycle. In  th e  past few decades, much 
work has been done in this regard. Q uite  a few new ideas and techniques, have 
evolved ou t of th is work. Conceptually, these are different, which m akes it  im pera­
tive to  devise a  way to  filter th is group of ideas based on regulatory, legislative and 
technical criteria . T his study  will address the  above issue by presenting  a few concep­
tually  represen ta tive  ideas and sub jec ting  them  to  a  decision filter. Essentially, th is 
effort is based on the  N ational Environm ental Policy A ct [Public Law 91-190, Secs. 
1 0 2 (2 )(C ), 1 0 2 (2 ) (D)], which recom m ends and insures th a t  a lte rn a tiv e  technologies 
are given app rop ria te  and careful consideration in the  decision m aking process for the 
m anagem ent of nuclear wastes.
C hap ter 2
F orm ulation  o f  T h e D ecision  Tree
As s ta ted  earlier, a  Decision Tree will be form ulated  to  in tegrate  as m any technologies 
as possible which re la te  to  m anaging High Level W aste( HLW ). This in tegration  of 
technology is envisaged to  serve as an  aid in re la ting  various m ethods and processes 
and  help in perceiving the  options available in achieving appropriate  tasks in m anag­
ing HLW. A Decision Tree is the  resu lt of a system s approach to  a problem . Hence, it 
is devised to  elaborate on the  system s and the  logistics of the  flow th a t  governs this 
form ulation.
2.1 Syntax o f the D ecision  Tree
M odule (M)
A m odule is a generic categorization tool. Essentially, it is a  p la te /page , which 
consists of a  finite num ber of system  com ponents.
Generic C oncept/P rocess ( GCP)
T his constitu tes of all concepts, processes and m ethods which need a decision input 
or which are fu rther categorized in to  elem ental processes and m ethods.
E lem ental C oncept/P rocess (ECP)
This constitu tes of all concepts, processes and m ethods, which serve as options to the
Generic concepts, processes and m ethods.
T ra n s  M o d u le  C o n n e c t io n  ( TM C)
This sustains the  serial flow of inform ation w ith in the  Decision Tree by providing a 
link between m odules a t strateg ic locations w ith in each m odule.
D e c is io n  N o d e  ( DN)
A Decision Node is th a t  point or junction , where flovvpaths, d irected  to E lem ental 
or Generic C oncepts/Processes m eet. T he decision is conveyed to the  Generic Con­
cep t/P rocess, th rough a filter assisted flow pa th  in a  branching flow and sustains 
decision flow in a  serial scheme.
P r im a r y  F i l t e r  ( PF)
A P rim ary  F ilte r inpu ts  a  decision to  a  Generic C oncept/P rocess, from  a prim ary  
branching Decision Node.- 
S e c o n d a ry  F i l t e r  (SF)
A Secondary F ilte r  inpu ts a decision to  a  Generic C oncept/P rocess, from  a  secondary 
branching Decision Node.
T e r t i a r y  F i l t e r  ( TF)
A T ertiary  F ilte r inpu ts  a  decision to  a  Generic C oncept/P rocess, from  a tertia ry  
b ranching  Decision Node.
T e r t i a r y  F i l t e r  ( TF)
A P rim ary  Flow P a th  is a single line representation  of decision flow w ithin  each 
m odule.
2.2 Flow Logic
Flow logic is im p o rtan t in deriving an understanding  of the  in tegration  schem e of a 
Decision Tree. In th is case th e  flow logic is defined a t a  m odule level. T h e  following 
logic schemes have been used in the subject Decision Tree.
T o p -D o w n  S c h e m e
In th is scheme, the  flow is essentially directed from  the  top  to  the  b o ttom  of a m odule. 
M odules 2,3 and 4 are based on this scheme.
Left-Right Schem e
This scheme requires the flow to begin on th e  leftside of a m odule and end on the 
right. Modules 4,5 and 6 are based on this scheme.
Loop Schem e
This is a very untypical schem e, as it redirects the flow to the in itial Generic Con­
cep t/P rocess. Only M odule 1 is fashioned on th is basis.
Branch Approach
This schem e is no t very comm on. Essentially, th is is resorted to, when num erous flow 
branches, h ut decisions to  a  few Generic C oncepts/Processes. M odule 7 is based 
on this scheme.
System  com ponents of the  subject Decision Tree are  as depicted  in fig.2.1. In m ost 
instances the  nom enclature  used to  describe various processes and m ethods, involves 
the  use of the  following syntax, separated  by a  hyphen or s ta r, depending on the 
n a tu re  of the  process. As a  rule, hyphens are used where flow paths are  not filter 
assisted, while the  stars are used where they  are assisted by filters.
M odule[]  Generic Concept Process[]  [  E lem ental Concept Process[] J
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DN[ ] 
GCP[ ]
J )  ECP[ ]
TMC[ ]
PF [ ]
SF [ ] 
TF [ ]
PFP [ ]
Decision Node 
Generic Concept/Process
Elemental Concept/Process
Trans Module Connection
Primary Filter 
Secondary Filter
Teritiary Filter 
Primary Flow Path
Figure 2.1: G raphic R epresentation of th e  system  com ponents of the  Decision Tree
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C hap ter 3 
P a th  and P ro cess  S u b stan tia tion
3.1 N uclear R eactor (M1-GCP1)
This is the  root process of the  Decision Tree, as the  w aste stream  is sourced from  this 
process. It is fu rther categorized into the  following elem ental processes.
3.1.1 C om m ercial R ea cto rs(M1-GCP1-ECP1)
This process represents the  nuclear power reactors, where the  phenom enon of nuclear 
fission is exploited as an energy resource.
3.1.2 D efen se R ea cto rs (M1-GCP1-ECP2)
This process represents those nuclear reactors operated  specifically to  generate  p lu ­
tonium .
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Figure 3.1: Schem atic of Reprocessing, Source: Y .S. Tang, J.H .Saling, Radioactive 
W aste M anagement, IS B N  0-89116-666-1
3.2 Fuel Reprocessing(M^-GCP^)
This is a series of physical and chemical operations, devised to  isolate u ran ium  and 
p lu tonium  from  spent nuclear fuel. T he u ran ium  so recovered from  these operations 
is e ither in the oxide form  for subsequent fuel fabrication or the  hexafluoride form for 
gas difb don trea tm en t. A num ber of reprocessing techniques have been developed 
and are broadly classified as aqueous and pyrom etallurgical processes. Various waste 
stream s are generated  by reprocessing operations as a  function of their classification. 
T he inpu t, o u tp u t and  the  wastes th a t are associated w ith a typical reprocessing 
operation  are depicted in fig. 3.1.
The m ost popular m ethod  am ong the aqueous processes is the  solvent ex traction  pro­
cess. This process involves the ex traction  of u ran ium  and p lu tonium  into  an organic 
phase as te travalen t and higher valent cations, leaving the  trivalen t form s in the  aque­
ous phase. This lean aqueous solution contains the  bulk of the fission p roducts and 
is trea ted  as High Level W aste(HLW ).
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Solvent ex traction  is preceded by head end operations, where in the  spent fuel is sub­
jected  to m echanical shearing and decladding. Further, it is oxidized from a univalent 
form  to a trivalent form. This results in a  swollen fuel and releases the balance of 
the  fission product gases, tritiu m  and 14C. T he dissolved solution is clarified and the 
solids isolated. U ranium  and plutonium  conversion follows solvent ex traction . U ra­
nium  is norm ally  wanted in the  oxide or hexachloride form. The ex tracted  solvent is 
calcined to obtain  the  oxide form. Subsequent flourination w ith gaseous fluorine in 
a  fluidized bed reacto r generates the hexafluoride form . P lu ton ium  is converted by 
p recip ita ting  it from  the  solution exiting the  solvent ex traction  operation, as an ox­
alate. This form  is filtered and calcined to  ob tain  a dioxide form. Gas stream s exiting 
th is process are tre a te d  w ith  absorbent beds of m ercurous n itra te , silver zeolites and 
ferric oxides, before release to  the  atm osphere.
T he operations of solvent ex traction  and u ran ium  and p lu tonium  conversion con­
s titu te  the process of chemical separations designated as M 1-G CP4  in the  decision 
tree. One a lte rna tive  in m anaging nuclear w aste would be to  a tten u a te  th e  toxicity 
by elim inating long lived isotopes by tran sm u ting  them  to  be short lived. This is 
particu larly  tru e  abou t actinides exiting the  head operations of reprocessing. These 
could be concentrated , m ixed w ith u ran ium  and p lu ton ium  ex tracted  from  spent fuel, 
and fabricated  as fuel rods for fu rther irrad iation . T his cycle of converting long lived 
isotopes is te rm ed  Transm utation, as depicted  in m odule 1 of the decision tree. A bout 
5 to 7 % transm u ta tion  is achieved for every irrad iation . The fission products from 
chemical separations are directed to  the  process of im m obilization.
3.3 Interim  Liquid Storage(Ml-GCP3)
T he liquid waste stream  exiting the reprocessing operation  in particu lar the  process 
of solvent ex traction  has to be isolated from the  environm ent. M ore often th an  not, 
this solution largely consists of n itric  acid and some u ran ium  th a t  could be reclaim ed
Air cooled 
condenser
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Grade
3 .8  m0 .33  m concrete 
outer liner *N'L
0  0 0 6  m steel 
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0.15  m
0  0 0 6  steel plate 23 m dio * 5 .5  m high
F igure 3.2: A typical double walled tan k  used for storing aqueous reprocessing w aste, 
Source: Modified from  K rauskopfiK ., Radioactive waste disposal and geology, Ref[18
during reprocessing. C urren t technology is to  pum p this solution in to  huge double 
walled steel and concrete tanks sunk beneath  th e  ground surface. T hese tanks are 
equipped w ith  various m onitoring  in strum en ta tion  to  detec t any possible out fall of 
th is solution. T he acidity of th e  sub jec t w aste solution is neutralized  by th e  addition  
of an alkali, which causes som e of th e  solutes to  prec ip ita te . E vaporation  leads to 
p a rtia l crystallization of o ther constituen ts. T his creates a  com plex m ix tu re  of solids 
and liquids in the tanks. A typ ica l double walled tank  is as depicted  in fig. 3.2.
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3.4 C irculating P ipe Sorage(M l-GCP5)
This involves the storage of aqueous radioactive waste in a network of pipes which 
are designed to  be capable of circulating the stored waste. Due its incom patibility  
w ith the reference technology of term inal disposal in a m ined geological repository, 
th is technology has been elaborated  in section A .l of A ppendix A.
3.5 Im m obilization(M )-GrCP^)
T he inherent lim ita tions of storing liquid nuclear waste in tanks, such as potential 
leakage and necessity of liquid w aste transfer for periods of hundreds of years, resulted 
in seeking a lte rn a te  m ethods of storage. One prom ising m ethod of storing waste is 
by im m obilizing it by achieving a phase conversion. Conversion to  a  solid phase 
offers m any advantages, nam ely, a  m ajo r reduction in waste volum e and a general 
sim plification of long range waste m anagem ent problem s. Since th is involves rendering 
the waste m ateria l bo th  im m obile and insoluble, the following properties are desired 
of the  waste form:
1 . Good capacity  to  accept all elem ents in the  waste.
2. C om position range flexible enough to  accom m odate variations in the  waste.
3. Low m elting  point to  fac ilita te  production.
4. High therm al conductiv ity  to dissipate the  heat produced by radioactive decay.
5. Good resistance to  leaking and rad iation  damage.
3.5.1 S Y N R O C  (Ml - GCP6 -ECP1)
This is a  syn the tic  rock th a t consists of a small num ber of tita n a te  m ineral phases, 
chosen because of th e ir geochem ical stab ility  and collective ability  to  accept into their
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Figure 3.3: T he SY N RO C Process, Source: Modified fo rm  Y.S.Tang, J.H .Saling, 
Radioactive waste managem ent, IS B N  0-89116-66-1
crystal s truc tu res nearly  all th e  elem ents present in th e  high level waste. These char­
acteristics yield a  w aste form  w ith exceptionally  high resistance to  leaching by ground 
w ater. T he SYNROC process, as first developed by the  A ustralian N ational Univer­
sity, involves the  generation of a precursor, by in tim ately  m ixing on a subm icrom eter 
scale, a  chem ically reactive and hom ogeneous com bination of T i, Zr, Ba, A1 and Ca 
oxides. This m ix tu re  is subsequently  slurried w ith the  high level waste, which results 
in the precursor.
T he SYNROC precursor so form ed is dried and  calcined in preparation  for reactive hot 
pressing. A fter calcination and baking, abou t 2-3% by weight fine T i m etal powder 
is in tim ately  m ixed w ith the  calcined precursor to  provide redox control during the 
subsequent ho t pressing operation. Densities th a t  are 99% of the  theoretical values 
can easily be achieved in th e  uniaxial hot pressing operation. As a  final step  the 
w aste m ateria l is sealed in a  stainless steel bellow shaped can [16].
3.5.2 C rystalline Ceram ic (Ml-GCP6-ECP2)
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These are glass ceram ics suitable for incorporation of high level waste and are 
prepared from precursor glasses which consist of m onzite w ith or w ithout zirconia 
crystals. Accordingly, the preferred com position contains a t least 5% oxides of La 
and Ce and sufficient P0O5, up to  20% to react therew ith  to  form  m onzite. The 
precursor glasses are  crystallized in situ  to glass-ceramic bodies by heat trea ting  at 
tem pera tu res between about 1250°C - 1550° C.
Of the  several possible em bodim ents of the basic m ethod, the  m ost efficient m ethod, 
involves the  m elting of the  precursor glass form ing batch . T he m elted  glass is then  
powdered and thoroughly blended w ith the  HLW and the  m ix tu re  is sim ultaneously 
crystallized and sin tered under controlled conditions in to  a  solid body. One of the 
standard  ceram ic form ing techniques, such as dry  pressing, extrusion or ho t pressing 
is used to  shape th e  body. As glass com positions can be form ulated to  flow and sinter 
prior to  crystallization, it  allows sintering to  be accom plished a t tem pera tu res as low 
as about 1400° C. Hence this m ethod provides the advantage of requiring a  lower 
firing tem pera tu re . Residual porosity m ay be present in the  final p roduct. However, 
judicious form ulation of the precursor glass com position can reduce this porosity to 
a m inim um  [8].
3.5.3 B orosilicate G lass ( M1-GCP6-ECP3)
Of all the  host m aterials th a t have been considered and evaluated, borosilicate glass 
has been judged the preferred host m ateria l for isolating and im m obilizing high level 
waste. M ore th an  any th ing, the move to  have borosilicate glass as th e  reference waste 
form, was prom pted by the  sim plicity associated w ith its fabrication , in addition to 
acceptable product perform ance properties. T he process of fixing HLW in borosilicate 
glass is e ither term ed  as glassification or vitrification.
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Typically, vitrification involves the  fixation of the processed HLW. The waste exiting 
the reprocessing operation constitu tes bo th  radioactive and non-radioactive elem ents. 
Chem ical processing isolates and separates the non-radioactive elem ents from the 
radioactive ones to a great degree (99.99%). The radioactive waste so isolated is 
in tim ately  m ixed with ground borosilicate glass a t subm icrom eter level, and fed in 
to  a m elter. Running at 2100° F, the m elter fuses the  feed. This fused m ateria l in 
its m olten  s ta te  exits out of the  m elter into canisters, which are stored at site for 
subsequent u ltim a te  disposal.
3.6 O nsite W aste M anagem ent ( M2-G CPI )
Conceptually, th is involves the  m anagem ent of HLW a t its source. M anagem ent in­
cludes e ither onsite in terim  or long te rm  storage. W aste handling, placem ent, fuel 
constituen t reconfiguration and fuel elem ent containarization  also constitu te  the  m an ­
agem ent of HLW, in sp ite  of being base level operations. As outlined  earlier, some of 
these storage schemes have been categorized under M odule 2.
3.7 W et Storage C oncepts(M2-GCP4)
These are those storage concepts which use a liquid as a  decay heat dissipator and 
m oderato r. The liquid is typically  w ater, contained in an enclosed pool. Concepts 
involving the  physical an d /o r  chem ical reconfiguration of the  fuel elem ents are also 
categorized under this GCP. W aterpools a t reactor sites have been used for storage 
since the  early  days of com m ercial nuclear reactor operations. However, these were 
often designed and sized to accom m odate only th ree reacto r discharges [15], as this 
w aste was supposed to  be shipped to  a dow nstream  operation  of fuel reprocessing, 
which has not m aterialized over the years. Consequently, fuel irrad ia tion  has tra n ­
spired to  be term inal, resulting in a steep rise in a t site  w aste inventory. This has 
necessitated  seeking a way to reconfigure this schem e or consider the  construction of
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additional storage pools.
3.7.1 R eracking ( M2-GCP4-ECP1)
The storage racks used in reacto r pools were originally designed with conservative cri­
teria. However, experience in spent fuel storage and im proved calculation techniques 
have shown th a t m any plan ts can increase their storage capacity  significantly, by 
changing to  storage racks w ith  closer spacings and still m eet the  seismic requirem ents 
and the  additional floor loadings. It is reported  th a t such a reduction in spacing 
betw een fuel assemblies results in an increase in the  storage capacity of a  pool by 
as m uch as 40% to  about 100% depending on the  individual sits. tion. Though a t­
trac tive , this schem e aggravates concerns about fuel c riticality  as a  function of fuel 
assem bly spacing. This can be addressed by allowing higher fuel burn up, which 
introduces a higher percentage of fission products th a t com pete w ith the  rem aining 
fissile m ateria l for available neutrons. Typically, a neu tron  absorber is also added 
to  th e  rack by sandwiching boron containing B 4C  betw een stainless steel p lates to 
m ake up the wall of each storage cell. T his form  of boron is claim ed to have a wide 
neu tron  absorption cross-section, and is capable of absorbing a  high percentage of the 
available neutrons.
3.7.2 Fuel R od C onsolid ation  (M2-GCP4-ECP2)
As opposed to  reracking, this process involves com plete d ism antling of the fuel 
assembly, fuel rod rearrangem ent in to  close-packed geom etry in a storage canister, 
com pacting the  rem aining s tru c tu ra l p a rts  and canning them . Typically, th is process 
results in the fuel rods from  two assem blies being able to  be stored in a canister having 
about the  sam e cross sectional dim ensions as the original assembly. Com paction of 
the s tru c tu ra l parts  results in the parts  from  6-10 assemblies being stored in a  canister 
sim ilar to th a t one used for con tainm ent of fuel rods. Inclusive of canister filled with
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struc tu ra l parts, the net gain in pool rack capacity through consolidation am ounts to 
a  factor of 1.5-1.7 of th a t of the  original rack capacity. It is reported  th a t by the use of 
sophisticated packaging and volume reduction equipm ent, a higher net gain is possible 
[27]. As w ith reracking, the  feasibility of the process is contingent upon the  structu ra l 
capability  of the storage in accepting the added weight. It is reported  th a t, about 
2.5 assemblies need to  be consolidated per storage rack location gained. This can be 
ex trapo la ted  to m ean th a t the  cost of added pool storage locations m ade available 
due to  consolidation is 2.5 tim es the unit consolidation cost. The m ajor concerns 
associated w ith im plem enting th is process are: possible hindrance of pool operations, 
the  po ten tia l for increasing rad iation  exposure of personnel, and criticality.
3.7.3 Supplem ental W ater P ool (M2-GCP4-ECP3)
This usually involves the  expansion of the  existing pool facilities or th e  construction 
of an additional pool. T he  obvious advantages of such a  provision, would be relia­
bility  and no possible allocation of resources for developm ent, as th is technology is 
proven and well established. However, the principal disadvantage of th is alternative 
is its relative inflexibility to  changing storage requirem ents and high capital cost. 
Consequently, the  cost of the  en tire  facility is incurred prior to  the  com m encem ent 
of storage operations, resulting  in high average un it costs. Also, the  operation of a 
supplem ental w ater pool requires relatively m ore day to  day a tten tion  and operating 
expense.
3.8 D ry Storage Technologies (M2-GCP3)
Dry storage involves the  storing of spent fuel in a shielded container outside th e  re­
actor containm ent building. Studies have ind icated  th a t  dry storage m ay be cost 
com petitive w ith wet storage options [15]. Conceptually, dry storage schemes have 
been configured such th a t  they  offer flexibility in system  types, so th a t they can be 
tailored to  the  needs of a specific site, providing long term  storage w ith low m ain te ­
nance and ready expandability. The feasibility of dry storage would be enhanced, if 
the  storage cask is designed such th a t it would serve as both  a storage and a shipping 
cask. T he possibility of a reportab le w ater pool contam ination  has m ade dry storage 
even m ore a ttrac tive .
3.8.1 V ault Storage (M2-GCP3-ECP1)
This concept has been developed and established outside the U.S [9]. However, na tu ra l 
convection vaults are now being considered for spent fuel storage a t reactor sites. The 
basic building of a typical vault comprises a m inim um  of two storage m odules with a 
tran sp o rt cask recep tion /d ispatch  facility located a t one end to  allow fu rther addition 
of storage m odules. W ith in  the  storage m odules, th e  irrad ia ted  fuel is housed in 
individual storage tubes arranged in a regular m atrix . Decay heat from  the  spent 
fuel is ind irectly  rejected  from  the  system  by a  passive heat transfer system . H eat 
rejection is achieved in two stages. P rim ary  heat rejection from  spent fuel to  the  
storage tube  is by rad ia tion  and convection, while the  secondary is from  the  storage 
tube  to  the  environm ent and is produced by a self regulating, n a tu ra l therm osyphonic 
buoyancy-driven cooling flow. This is achieved by using am bient air flowing over 
the  storage tubes. T he constraining tem pera tu re  for the  operation of th is cooling 
system  is around 150°C for a typical fuel assembly. In m ost vault installations the  
storage tubes are connected to  a  com m on m anifold system  composed of small bore 
pipew ork, which in tu rn  is connected to  one of two auxiliary gas service systen.o. This 
system  allows the  gas environm ent w ithin the storage tube  to  be m onitored, changed 
and pressure regulated. One of these system s uses nitrogen to  m ain tain  an inert 
atm osphere. M onitored and alarm ed flow m easurem ent instrum ents de tec t leakage 
by excess nitrogen usage. Usually, nitrogen is m ain ta ined  only until storing in a ir is 
possible.
In the past th e  principal disadvantages of vaults have been relative inflexibility to 
changing storage requirem ents and high initial capital cost. However, the vault design 
as discussed herein, affords flexibility due to its m odular basis. Also, the  m odularity
of this schem e results in a significantly low unit cost.
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3.8.2 M etal Cask Storage ( M2-GCP3-ECP2)
This type  of dry storage accom m odates the  possibility of having a dual purpose 
container for bo th  storing and transporting  as suggested earlier. This process involves 
the  placem ent of spent fuel in m eta l casks about 2.5m in d iam eter, 5m in height and 
weighing abou t 100 tons. T he loaded cask is transported  to  the  storage a rea  and 
loaded on a concrete pad [14]. A system  for m onitoring the  in tegrity  of cask seals 
and  for detecting  releases is typically  installed. Decay heat from  the  spent fuel is 
conducted through the finned m eta l cask wall and transferred  to  the atm osphere by 
surface convection and therm al radiation. A ppropria te  overpacks and im pactors are 
provided for the  cask to  serve as a shipping container. M ost often, the storage area 
is isolated by fencing th e  boundaries to  prevent intrusion.
3.8 .3  C oncrete M od u le Storage (M2-GCP5)
Spent fuel isolation in concrete m odules is conceptually  based on the  reliability  of 
concrete as an excellent shielding m aterial. Due to  the  low therm al conductiv ity  
of concrete, it  is im p o rtan t to  install an a lte rna te  decay heat rejection system  to 
tra n sm it heat to  the environm ent. In addition  to  its shielding capabilities, concrete 
is also known to be an excellent s tru c tu ra l m ateria l, when hoop reinforced w ith steel 
re-bar. T he use of concrete enhances the  feasibility of dry storage due to  relative 
economics.
3.9 H orizontal Em placem ent (M2-GCP6)
T he m ost efficient geom etrical shape in volume in th is context is a  cylinder . Conse­
quently , a cylindrical shielded canister is used in containing fuel elem ents. However, 
when em placed horizontally, these canisters need a harnessing m echanism , which is
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usually provided. These canisters are enclosed in an air circulating cham ber. C an­
isters are em placed horizontally to  avoid slender vertical standing  spent fuel storage 
containers, as these are unstable. This schem e is m ost suited  for long fuel assemblies.
3.9.1 N U T E C H  M odule (M2-GCP6-ECP1)
T he m ajor com ponents of th is system  are a Dry Shielded C anister (DSC), a  Hori­
zontal Storage M odule (HSM) and a transfer cask [19]. These com ponents are linked 
logistically to achieve safe storage of spent fuel. T he DSC is a  stainless steel cylinder, 
w ith  an  in ternal stainless basket assem bly to  m ain ta in  th e  spent fuel assem bly in a 
safe geom etry during loading, transfer, storage and cask drop events. The canister is 
typically  designed for optim um  struc tu ra l perform ance, c riticality  control and decay 
heat removal capacity. It also provides for the  containm ent of an inert environm ent 
during storage to  prevent fuel oxidation. This canister is housed in a  HSM to  achieve 
rad ia tion  shielding and to  provide a passive m echanism  for the removal of decay heat 
by n a tu ra l circulation of am bient air. T he HSM is a  steel reinforced concrete struc­
tu re  which adequately  p ro tects the  canisters from  postu la ted  n a tu ra l hazards. The 
canister is transferred  from  the fuel building to  the  HSM, contained in a transfer 
cask. This cask also provides protection for th e  canister pressure boundary for a 
range of drop accidents. T he transfer cask is shielded against neu tron  escape in all 
directions. This system  is inherently  flexible and  can be configured to  accom m odate a 
wide range of specific p lan t storage needs. T he  favorable economics of th is schem e are 
augm ented w ith increasing size, due to  the  fact th a t  the concrete horizontal storage 
m odule design rem ains essentially unchanged for larger sized canisters.
3.10 Vertical Em placem ent (M2-GCP7)
As opposed to horizontal em placem ent, this schem e is suitable for relatively shorter 
and bulkier fuel assemblies, vertical em placem ent requires no harness for stability. 
T he only constrain t being the  height of the vertical standing  canister, which should
be significantly higher th an  its d iam eter. More often than  not these canisters are 
m ade to sit on concrete pads and are enclosed.
3.10.1 B & W  C onstar M odule (M2-GCP7-ECP1)
This spent fuel containm ent and storage scheme has been devised to use m aterials 
trad itional to  the  nuclear power industry , thus accentuating reliability  [5]. T he storage 
m odule m easures 10 ft in height, weighing 171 tons, fully loaded. It is constructed  
of an external high density concrete vessel and an in ternal carbon steel liner. It 
has a sealed and bolted prim ary  closure and a  welded secondary closure for double 
containm ent. W ater carrying copper tubes are provided a t stra teg ic  locations to 
effectively reject decay heat. These pipes passively tran sm it the  decay heat ou t to  
the environm ent. T he efficiency of these pipes in heat rem oval is fu rther enhanced 
by providing copper fins on sections of pipe th a t  extend outside th e  concrete body. 
Each cask is an independent, self contained storage m odule. Hence, storage casks and 
support foundations m ay be constructed  on an as needed basis.
3.10.2 P S N  V entilated  Cask ( M2-GCP7-ECP2)
The m ajor com ponents of this schem e are, a m ulti-assem bly sealed basket (M SB), a 
ventilated  concrete cask (VCC), a transfer cask, im pact resisting and lim iting pads, 
and a vacuum  drying and helium  backfill system  [6]. T he VCC is a  high density 
concrete cask, which provides s tru c tu ra l support, shielding and n a tu ra l convection 
cooling for the MSB. T he in ternal cavity  of the cask is form ed by a steel cylinder 
which is welded to the  concrete reinforcing studs to  achieve a  rigid storage structure . 
The logistics of this schem e involves placing the  MSB in a  transfer cask and placing 
this assem bly in the storage pool for transferring spent fuel. T he loaded assembly 
is moved to  a  decontam ination area to allow for drying and subsequent back filling 
w ith an inert gas, such as helium . T he gas backfilled MSB is m oved from  the  transfer 
cask to the ventila ted  cask, which is transported  to the storage area and placed on a
concrete pad. T he decay heat from  spent fuel is ventilated  out of the cask by internal 
airflow via natural circulation around the MSB outer wall.
3.11 M onitored R etrievable Storage (M3-GCP1)
M onitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) is the  long term  isolation of spent fuel and high 
level w aste in facilities th a t perm it continuous m onitoring, ready retrieval and periodic 
m ain tenance as necessary to  ensure containm ent of the radioactive m ateria l. An MRS 
facility is considered to be an im portan t p a rt of the  overall waste m anagem ent system . 
Consequently, the  perform ance of the waste m anagem ent system  can be enhanced by 
locating such a facility central to  m ost com m ercial nuclear reactors and devising it 
such th a t, it is functional in preparing spent fuel for em placem ent in a  repository. 
L im ited  in terim  storage technologies, requiring no external power are best su ited  for 
this situation . As w ith  m ost dry storage technologies, the  spent fuel assemblies are 
typically  d ism antled  and reconfigured to  achieve fuel rod consolidation. Ostensibly, 
some of the  technologies discussed under a t site  w aste m anagem ent category can be 
reconfigured to suit MRS requirem ents.
3.12 D ryw ell C oncept (MS-GCP2)
This concept is based on th e  idea of em placing the  w aste canister in a  dry  well, which 
could be either drilled on the  surface or a near surface tunnel. It uses the  surrounding 
soil as a rad iation  shield.
3.12.1 F ield  D ryw ell (MS-GCP2-ECP1)
An MRS facility of th is na tu re , uses stationary , in ground, dry sealed containers for 
storage of spent fuel or reprocessing wastes. A typical facility consists of an array 
of near surface drywells in a field into which canisters of radioactive m ateria l are
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Figure 3.4: Typical drywell, Source: DOE, Technology fo r  commercial radioactive 
waste m anagem ent, Ref[7]
placed, and from  which, canisters can be retrieved  for final deposition. This facility 
also has an on site tran spo rte r contain ing  a  shielded tran sfer cask and  a  system  for 
detec ting  any releases of rad ioactive m aterial. Dry wells m ay be inserted  in to  the 
soil a t an existing site  or an engineered berm  m ay be bu ilt to  ensure consistent soil 
characteristics and alleviate w ater in trusion  problem s. T he  surrounding soil aids in 
tran sm ittin g  the decay heat to  th e  environm ent. A typ ica l drywell is about 0.7m in 
d iam eter and extends up to 6 to  8m  in to  the  ground and  is as shown in fig. 3.4-
3.12.2  Tunnel D ryw ell ( M3-GCP2-ECP2)
This MRS facility uses underground storage of spent fuel or reprocessing v a ites in 
dry, sealed containers and em placed w ithin a  m ined tunnel. Storage facilities are 
located in a hard rock near surface tunnel and above th e  ground w ater table. O ther 
than  the  em placem ent location the  basic configuration of the  drywell rem ains the 
sam e as th a t used in the field dryw ell concept and is as shown in fig. 3./h
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3.13 Vault Concept (M3-GCP5)
This concept requires the  storage of the  spent fuel canister in a shielded m odule or 
enclosure. However, vaults differ in the technique used in dissipating decay heat and 
the  type and size of the  storage enclosure.
3.13.1 O pen C ycle V ault ( M3-GCP5-ECPI)
A typical MRS facility of th is na tu re , comprises of a  large building, shielded w ith thick 
concrete, and large volum e ventilation stacks. A system  of air ducts th a t  direct and 
d istribu te  outside air past the  storage tubes for cooling and a  system  for m onitoring 
a ir in the interior of the storage tubes to  detect any leakage of radioactive m ateria l are 
inherent to this facility. A m echanical canister tran spo rting  and em placing system  is 
also p a rt of the facility. M ultiple release isolation barriers are exploited by th is design 
in a ttenuating  a possible radioactive release.
3.13.2 C losed C ycle Vault (M3-GCP5-ECP2)
Conceptually, these are sim ilar to  open cycle vaults, in th a t  bo th  provide relatively 
large, shielded enclosures for storage and bo th  rely on n a tu ra l circulation of air to 
rem ove the  decay heat passively. However, in a closed cycle vault, decay heat is 
transferred  from the  waste package to  air by an in te rm ed ia te  fluid. Consequentially, 
no direct contact of circulating air w ith the  waste packages is m ade. M ost m ajor 
com ponents of this facility would be sim ilar to those of an open cycle vault, however, 
in general they would be higher in complexity. A typical closed cycle vault would 
have m ultip le storage m odules containing silos, large sealed containm ent canisters, 
can ister transfer casks and a silo loading m achine th a t  transports  and inserts the  
can ister in the storage m odule. Decay heat is passively dissipated to  air by heat 
p ipes in com bination w ith air passages in concrete [9].
3.14 Tunnel Rack Concept (M3-GCP3)
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This comprises of a  system  of strategically  drilled tunnels, serving different functions, 
which include, can ister rack storage, storage tunnel access, canister rack transfer and 
decay heat ventilation. T he canister storage racks, as m entioned here, are unshielded 
and designed to be transportab le . Ostensibly, rem otely operated  m achines are used 
to  move these racks. T he tunnel needs to  be in a stable soil or rock m ass, as this 
schem e is devised on the  prem ise th a t  this soil or rock mass would adequately  shield 
the  radioactive m aterial.
3.15 Cask C oncept (M3-GCP4)
M etal or concrete casks are typically m ade for m onitored retrievable storage of ra­
dioactive m ateria l. Usually, these are extensions or reconfigured versions of w hat has 
been discussed under at site dry storage technologies, in particu la r the  option bearing 
the  p a th  M 2-G CP3.
3.15.1 M eta l Cask (M3-GCP4-ECP1)
In m ost cases, th is is sim ilar to  w hat has been discussed under m etal cask storage, 
which is categorized under dry storage technologies and bears the  pa th  M 2-G CP3- 
ECP2.
3.15.2 C oncrete  Cask ( M3-GCP4-ECP2)
This is sim ilar to  w hat has been discussed under concrete m odule storage, which is 
categorized under dry  storage technologies and bears the p a th  M 2-GCP5. However, 
a variant of th is concept exists, wherein a cask sim ilar in configuration to  the  regular 
concrete cask is placed in a  burial trench  or a berm , th a t is subsequently  backfilled to 
level w ith the  top  of cask. This adds ano ther release isolation barrier, the  surrounding
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soil mass.
3.16 U ltim ate D isposal (M4-GCP1)
Also term ed as term inal disposal, it usually involves m ethods and processes which 
aid in the isolation of nuclear waste for an ex trem e length of tim e. The m agnitude of 
the design life of these facilities is adequately  justified in the  light of the longevity of 
radionuclide toxicity.
3.17 E xtraterrestrial D isposal (M4-GCP5)
Popularly known as the space option, th is involves the deploym ent of the  nuclear 
waste m odule in space. Due its rem ote adherence to  the  reference technology of 
term inal disposal in a  m ined geological repository, the options associated w ith this 
concept of disposal are elaborated  in section A .2 of A ppendix A.
3.18 Terrestrial D isposal (M4-GCP2)
This is th e  generic disposal m ode th a t  would contain the high level nuclear waste 
w ithin the  geosphere. However, various possibilities exist in doing so. Some of these 
are as discussed hereafter.
3.18.1 Subseabed  D isp osal ( M4-GCP3)
Disposing radioactive waste in the depths of the ocean, has been considered and is 
thought to  be a feasible a lternative. T he perception of the ocean being a huge isola­
tion barrier m akes th is option a ttrac tiv e . As seventy percent of the E arth  is covered 
w ith oceans, the  dispersion of the  radionuclides as a consequence of a possible breach 
in the disposal canister, would be very lim ited. A few mobile radioactive species,
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such as iodine would disperse to a greater degree. However, the concentrations would 
be very much under the background rad iation  levels. The oceans are usually divided 
into three zones, near shore, continental shelf and deep sea reservoir. The near shore 
environm ent includes the  in tertidal zone of open coast as well as those areas th a t are 
partly  enclosed by land. C urrents and various m ixing processes are relatively intense 
in this zone. Hence, the  near shore environm ent is not being considered favorably 
for radioactive waste disposal. T he subm arine rim  of the continental land masses is 
term ed  as a continental shelf and typically runs to  a  dep th  of 400 m. Though con­
sidered a ttrac tiv e  earlier due to the presence of active subduction zones, in terest in 
this ocean environm ent has waned, since. It was thought th a t  em placed radioactive 
waste would be subducted  in to  the  E arths crust, thus achieving perm anence in waste 
isolation. However, insufficient knowledge of th e  subduction  m echanism  has raised 
concerns. Also, th e  presence of eddy curren ts, m akes the  continental shelf environ­
m ent unfavorable for subseabed radioactive w aste em placem ent.
T he deep sea environm ent makes up abou t 75 % of the  to ta l volume. Essentially, 
th is environm ent consists of two zones, separated  by w hat is called a  therm ocline. 
T he upper zone has relatively active mixing, while th e  lower zone is unm ixed. The 
therm ocline im pedes elem ental transfer betw een the  two zones, which is substan tia ted  
by m inim al variation in the salinity  of deep sea w ater [3]. H orizontal m ovem ent is 
m ore pronounced th an  vertical m ixing in th is zone. This can be ex trapo lated  to 
m ean th a t any point source contam ination  in deep oceans, would be so dispersed 
horizontally, th a t only below background am ounts of the  m ateria l would reach the 
surface layers, where even fu rther dispersal would occur. Further, deep ocean floor is 
covered w ith a reddish clay, often to  depths of hundreds of m eters. This clay is known 
for its capacity  to  sorb. Hence a  radionuclide spill would be readily sorbed by this 
clay, even before exposing the  contam inants to  the  lower zone. Also, these clays are 
known to be extrem ely  stable and capable of contain ing radionuclides for a  sufficient 
tim e for them  to decay to innocus daughter products. In all aspects, the  deep sea 
environm ent would be the best possible subseabed radioactive w aste em placem ent
zone. Typically, the  w aste m aterial is enclosed in m etal containers, transported  by 
rail to  an ocean port and carried by ship to the disposal area. The waste container 
is em placed by either of two m ethods discussed under here.
D r i l le d  E m p la c e m e n t  ( M 4-G C P3-EC P1 )
In this m ethod, a borehole is drilled in to  the  seabed by a drill rig ship [71. P art 
of the  drilling procedure involves the  placem ent of a drill stem , which would aid 
in guiding the  w aste containers into the  boreholes. This m ethod would even allow 
the retrieval of these containers, by relocating th e  drilled holes and ex tracting  the 
containers. Further, this m ethod would involve the least risk and be relatively robust. 
However, drilled em placem ent would be, by far, th e  m ost expensive m ethod of waste 
em placem ent.
P e n e t r a t o r  (M 4-G C P3-ECP2)
Conceptually, this m ethod would involve, shaping the  waste canister as a  projectile  
or enclosing them  in a sheath  shaped as one and  le ttin g  them  fall free to the  ocean 
bo ttom . Since a typical fall is around five to  six thousand m eters, these projectiles 
develop a  significant im pact velocity, which aids in achieving burial depths of up to  
30 to  40 m eters. This m ethod  is a ttrac tiv e  for its sim plicity. However, its technical 
feasibility and relative perform ance and reliability, need to  be assessed, before final 
endorsem ent. To th a t  end, hydrodynam ic analysis was carried out on a num ber of 
different possible configurations, nose shape, length to  d iam eter ratios and stabilizing 
surfaces. These studies were aim ed at designing a p en e tra to r th a t would be stable 
during  its fall and would achieve m axim um  possible p ene tra tion  on im pact w ith the  
sedim ent. On the basis of these studies, a design for a  large d iam eter pene tra to r 
has been proposed, w ith the following characteristics: length 4.8m , d iam eter 0.324m, 
construction  m aterials, m ild steel and lead and a  weight of 2.8 tons in air [4]. The 
possibility  of power propelling these projectiles to  achieve g rea ter im pact velocities, 
consequently enhancing the  burial depth , is also being evaluated. One of the  m a­
jo r concerns with this concept is hole closure, subsequent to  projectile  im pact. This
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can be adequately  addressed, only by a thorough analysis of the geotechnical and 
geochem ical characteristics of the  sub jec t zones. Such an analysis would have to 
be supported  by ap p ro p ria te  d a ta  com piled by transm ission system s using onboard 
in strum en t packages. T his d a ta  would also aid in analyzing nuclide m igration phe­
nom enon. T he subseabed environm ent being highly corrosive, the waste container has 
to  be engineered to  w ith stand  a hostile environm ent. An alloy of titan ium  ( Ticode 
12 ) [18], is being considered for th is application, as a  consequence of its inherent 
resistance to  the  sub jec t environm ent. Various possible configurations of penetrato rs 
are as shown in fig. 3.5.
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3.18.2 Ice Sheet D isposal ( M4-GCP2-ECP1)
This involves placing radioactive waste into continental ice masses in isolated areas, 
such as the poles. The waste would be placed in the  ice a t shallow depths, where 
it would m elt its way down in to  the  ice sheet. T hree types of em placem ent in ice 
have been proposed. One calls for sim ple m elting of the radioactive wastes into the 
ice w ithout any chance for retrievability. M elting efficiency could be im proved by 
th e  use of special canisters. A second m ethod  calls for anchored em placem ent, in 
which the  canisters would be a ttached  to  th e  surface, so th a t the  canisters could 
be retrieved, if so desired. In a th ird  m ethod , a  surface storage facility would be 
constructed , in which a specified am ount of waste would be stored, after which the 
en tire  facility  would be allowed to  m elt into the ice. This th ird  m ethod also rules 
ou t th e  possibility  of retrievability. T he m ain  advantage of ice sheet disposal is its 
isolation from  hum an dwellings. However, unknown param eters such as, evolutionary 
processes in ice sheets, d istribu tion  of areas of high flows in ice and the  am ount and 
d istribu tion  of volcanic centers, m ake th is m ethod una ttrac tive . F u rther, the  ecology 
of the  poles is no t extensively stud ied , hence th e  im pact of radioactive wastes on 
ice would need m ore evaluation. Also, devising a tran spo rta tion  system  for such a 
schem e would be com plex and im plem enting such a schem e would involve high risk.
3.19 U ltim ate Liquid Storage ( M4 -GCP4 )
High Level W aste ( HLW ) liquid, sourced from  reprocessing operations and stored at 
an in terim  facility as discussed earlier, can be disposed term inally  w ith out achieving 
a phase conversion. Two m ethods have been researched and evaluated to  achieve this 
objective. T hey are, as discussed in the  following subsections.
3.19.1 R ock M elt D isposal (M4 -GCP4 -ECPI)
This concept involves the direct em placem ent of aqueous phase HLW into under­
ground cavities. This concept is based on the assum ption th a t  after evaporation 
of w ater from the  transport phase, the heat from the rem aining radioactive waste 
would cause m elting of the  surrounding rocks, with later dissolution of the waste. 
This aqueous m ix ture  would homogenize w ith tim e at sites well below the surface 
with subsequent com pletion of the  solidification process. This process of solidifica­
tion would take several hundred years, during which the fission p roducts would have 
been transform ed to  actin ide com ponents, u ltim ately  resulting in th e  encapsulation 
of the  radioactive m ateria l in a  relatively  insoluble rock m atrix . T his m ethod lim its 
the relative hazard  index of resolidified rock m ass to  less th an  1 %. In locating a 
geological site for rock m elting, w ater should be excluded from  the  vicinity of the 
w aste for th e  first few hundred years after em placem ent. R elatively unfractured  dry 
granite  body is being considered for th is option. W aste s tab ility  is also enhanced 
by sufficiently deep burial, as it slows cooling, perm itting  crysta llization  of the m elt 
into stable m ineral phases. T he form ation of m ineral phases can be aided by adding 
m aterials such as P o J 3 and Z r .  These m ineral phases ( m onzite, thorite, zircon ), 
tend to  be ex trem ely  resistan t to  leaching. F urther, several n a tu ra l analogs are known 
to exist, to  verify, assess and evaluate th is concept. Though technically  feasible, this 
concept presents m any uncertain ties in the  absence of sufficient d a ta  to  substan tia te  
on waste-rock in teractions. O ther m ajo r concerns include, irre trievab ility  of wastes 
and the  need to  handle w ater and steam  pum ped from  m ined cavities.
3.19.2 W ell In jection  D isp osa l (M4-GCP4-ECP2)
Two different injection m ethods have been developed, the  deep well injection m ethod 
and the  shale grout injection m ethod. In the  deep well m ethod, acidic liquid wastes 
are pum ped in to  rocks, isolated from  the biosphere to  depths of 1000 to  5000 m. 
Porosity and perm eability  are acceptable to  a  certain  degree in these rocks, however, 
these are essentially overlain by an im pervious s tra ta , typically shales. This allows
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for horizontal m ovem ent, but lim its vertical m igration. C andidate  rocks best suited 
for the well injection m ethod are sandstones, especially those in synclines, where in­
jected  rocks are overlain by an im pervious s tra ta . The chem istry and lithology of the 
injected rocks m ust be known, so th a t accurate predictions of radionuclide behavior 
could be m ade. T he characteristics and hydrology of m any such rocks are known, 
due to the  extensive investigation and experience of the oil and gas industry.
The shale grout m ethod  requires the  fracturing  of candidate shale by high pressure 
w ater injection, after which a m ix ture  of wastes, clay and cem ent are in jected  into fa­
vorable shale a t depths of 300 to 500 m. T he injected slurry is then  allowed to solidify 
in situ. T he low perm eability  and porosity of shale lim its m igration of the  injected 
m aterial. F u rther, the  high sorption po ten tia l, hinders any possible radionuclide 
m ovem ent. H orizontal stresses are greater th an  vertical stresses in shale, resulting in 
fractures parallel to  the  bedding planes. Ostensibly, these fractures m inim ize vertical 
tran spo rt, while restric ting  any possible radionuclide flow, to the  shale horizon. This 
m ethod is a ttrac tiv e  due to  the abundance of shale form ations. Further, it has been 
dem onstrated  successfully a t the Oak Ridge N ational Laboratory, for which, neces­
sary em placem ent technology has been developed [26]. This enhances the feasibility 
of this m ethod. However, concerns do exist, which need to  be addressed, before final 
endorsem ent. One m ajo r concern is the  possibility of tectonic activity , in itia ted  by ei­
ther hydrofracturing or waste injection. Irretrievability  of wastes is ano ther justifiable 
concern w ith this m ethod.
3.20 G eological R epository (M5-GCP1)
A geological repository  is strategically  and specifically m ined for the  em placem ent of 
a w aste canister, such th a t the  waste form  is isolated from  th e  biosphere for several 
thousand years, or so contained th a t the  ex ten t of radioactive m ateria l th a t m ight 
escape from  the  canister and reach the  biosphere would be insufficient to pose a 
health  hazard. T he canister em placem ent zone of the  repository is typically at a
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great depth , so as to isolate the sta ted  waste from  surface processes and natural 
phenom ena, including wind action, glaciation, m eteorite  im pact or weathering. The 
form er criteria  would suggest, as great a  depth  as economically feasible. However, the 
dep th  of the em placem ent zone is a function of the  lithostatic  pressure, as a  higher 
than  allowable pressure would pose a th rea t to  the m ined shafts and tunnels. As 
opposed to  o ther generic radioactive waste disposal schemes, geological repositories 
are engineered specifically for a  site, as a  function of the hydrogeological, geochemical, 
geological and geotechnical variables of th a t site. A fully developed repository  is 
proposed to  consist of surface facilities, underground facilities and shafts, tunnels and 
ram ps connecting these facilities. The waste is received and prepared for disposal 
a t th e  surface facilities. T he shafts, tunnels and ram ps are used for transporting  
w aste canisters to  the  underground facilities. T he underground facility constitu tes of 
the canister em placem ent zone and appropriate ly  deployed em placem ent equipm ent. 
T he dim ensions and configuration of th e  geological repository depend on the  decision 
inpu ts  from  the  appropria te  decision nodes, as shown in M odule 5 of the  decision 
tree. The op tim al e lem ental p rocesses/m ethods, th a t  need to  be decided upon, are 
as elaborated  below.
3.20.1 H eat Tailored ( M5-GCP1*ECP6)
This is a design concept, which enhances and extends th e  perform ance of the  waste 
package containers by op tim al m anagem ent of the  decay energy em itted  by the  ra ­
dioactive wastes. This involves establishing a therm al barrier, ceiled a t th e  uncon­
fined boiling point of w ater to  preclude the presence of w ater in the vicinity of the 
em placed waste. This barrier is achieved by ad justing  the  spatial d istribu tion  of 
the  energy deposition w ithin the  repository, thus com pensating for the differences 
in the  waste form  characteristics and geom etric properties of th e  repository. There 
are a t least four different techniques th a t can be em ployed either independently  or 
in com bination to achieve heat tailoring. An inventory m anagem ent schem e term ed 
receipt tailoring  is one. It depends on controlling the  age and burnup of the  waste.
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Taken together, they determ ine the  in tegrated  energy th a t would be eventually re­
leased. A ppropriate  control of these param eters would result in a waste stream  w ith 
a nearly uniform  energy d istribu tion  throughout the  spatial ex ten t of the  repository. 
T he second technique term ed  as geometric tailoring employs a m odification to  the 
em placem ent panel geom etry. By varying param eters such as em placem ent hole and 
drift spacings, the  boundary  effects near th e  perim eter of th e  panel and variations 
in the waste characteristics can be com pensated. This approach is lim ited  by m in­
im um  interhole spacings, as required by operational and s truc tu ra l constra in ts. It 
also requires fairly detailed  inform ation on th e  waste characteristics well in  advance 
of its receipt to  affect appropria te  ad justm ents in panel design. A th ird  technique 
called package scale tailoring , involves th e  selection of fuel based on its  characteristics 
for individual packages and the ir positioning in  the  em placed array  to  com pensate 
for boundary effects. L im itations to  th is approach m ay come from  constra in ts on 
the  m axim um  th erm al load w ithin a single package. Finally, a  fourth  technique th a t 
could be used to  tailo r th e  energy d istribu tion , would involve a  different approach in 
placing spent fuel and im m obilized high level waste, w ith regard to  their locations in 
th e  repository. Several o ther schemes are  possible. However, they  would involve the  
m anipulation  of the  above discussed param eters.
3.20.2 OFF C oncept (M5-GCP1*ECP5)
T he Old Fuel F irs t (O F F ) concept involves th e  em placem ent of the  radioactive waste, 
based exclusively on the age or tim e since discharge of th e  waste. It has been reported , 
th a t , th e  use of the  O F F  concept, would resu lt in a energy d istribu tion  th a t  could 
vary by more th an  a factor of three over th e  repository  [20]. T his should serve as 
adequate  substan tia tion  of the possible therm al pe rtu rb a tio n  in itia ted  by such an 
approach. T his approach would essentially decrease the  dom ain of safety, due to 
possible inaccuracies in predictions of the  repository environm ent. However, this 
approach is beneficial in cost, as it obviates the  need for the  auxiliary  logistics, as 
required by the H eat Tailoring Concept.
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3.20.3 Island (M5-GCP1*ECP4)
A geological repository can be located on an island as, such an approach would add the  
oceans as another na tu ra l isolation barrier. The possible use of an island repository 
as an in ternational facility, makes it w orth considering. T hree types of islands are 
available for repository considerations, continental islands, oceanic islands and island 
arcs. O f th e  th ree , continental islands are recom m ended for such use. Essentially, 
due to a  reduced risk of volcanism . Though technically feasible, island repositories 
have serious disadvantages. F irst, they  are very expensive to  im plem ent and second, 
they  have a  very high short term  risk, specifically during tran sp o rta tio n  operations
3.20.4  C ontinenta l d isposal (M5-GCP1*ECP3)
This involves locating the  geological repository on a continental land mass. This 
would be th e  best possible a lternative  in m any respects, public fear and lim ited  or no 
in te rnationa l use are  two possible exceptions.
3.20.5 U nsatu rated  (M5-GCP1*ECP2)
In an un sa tu ra ted  repository, no w ater is present. I t  is obvious th a t the  presence of 
w ater in troduces an  oxidizing environm ent. M ost m ateria ls considered for canisters 
are  susceptib le to  th is environm ent. Thus, an u nsa tu ra ted  repository  would allow the  
use of qu ite  a  few m ateria ls for can itser fabrication. However, decay heat m anagem ent 
is a concern in u nsa tu ra ted  repositories.
3.20.6 Saturated  (M5-GCP1*ECP2)
In a sa tu ra te d  repository, the  w ater tab le  is not very m uch lower th an  the  em placem ent 
zone of the  repository. In th is concept w ater is perceived to  be a decay heat m oderator. 
However concerns about canister corrosion due to  its presence, m akes th is concept 
u n a ttrac tiv e .
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3.21 Em placem ent Configuration (M5*GCP2)
Devising an appropriate  waste package em placem ent configuration is crucial to  the 
success of a m ined repository. T he right m ode and exact dimensions of canister em­
placem ent, are functions of the  input from the appropriate  decision nodes as depicted 
in M odule 5.
3.21.1 E m placem ent drifts (M5*GCP2*ECP1)
Disposal containers can be placed in em placem ent drifts directly, obviating the  need 
for drilling bore holes. T he Swiss concept applies th is m ethod in disposing their 
vitrified HLW. T he drifts in th e ir case are in a  body of gran ite  rock. F urther the  
Swiss concept requires the  drift to  be backfilled w ith  highly com pacted bentonite  
blocks, consequent to  w aste canister em placem ent.
3.21.2 B ore H oles in E m placem ent drifts (M5*GCP3)
T he repository  design could be fu rth e r enhanced by drilling bore holes in  em placem ent 
drifts. This effectively reduces the  com plexity of waste canister em placem ent as the 
em placem ent drifts are designed to  allow em placem ent m achine accessibility. These 
bore holes can be horizontal, vertical or inclined and can have one to  up to  40 waste 
canisters em placed in them .
Horizontal Em placem ent (M5*GCP3*ECP1)
This consists of em placing th e  w aste canisters in long horizontal holes drilled in 
the  walls of m ined drifts. In m ost horizontal em placem ent configurations, m ultip le 
canisters are placed in each bore hole, thus requiring relatively less m ining of rock. 
Also, th is technique would resu lt in a  lower degree of d isruption of the  na tu ra l repos­
itory geology and a  m uch lower cost. However, the  boring equipm ent required to 
drill relatively long horizontal em placem ent holes in the relatively sm all diam eters
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Figure 3.6: P lan  view of a horizontally  em placed repository, Source: Preclosure analy­
sis o f conceptual waste package designs fo r  a nuclear waste repository in Tuff, Ref[25]
required for w aste em placem ent is reportedly  unavailable. This in troduces a higher 
level of uncerta in ty  as to  w hether th e  holes are  technically feasible to  bore. A plan 
view of a horizontally  em placed repository  is as dep icted  in fig. 3.8
V e r tic a l  E m p la c e m e n t  ( M 5*G C P3*EC P2 )
This consists of em placing th e  waste canisters in vertical holes bored in mined 
drifts which contain one or m ore w aste canisters. T he U.S reference design uses 
th is em placem ent configuration w ith one w aste package per bore hole. T he G erm an 
reference design uses a  sim ilar em placem ent configuration, excepting the  num ber of 
canisters em placed per bore hole [24]. Though th is m ethod  involves a relatively higher 
degree of m ining, vertical drilling and boring technology is readily available. Hence 
there is no uncerta in ty  associated with this configuration of em placem ent. Plan and 
cross sectional views of a vertically em placed repository  are as depicted in jig. o.P.
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analysis o f conceptual waste package designs fo r  a nuclear waste repository in Tuff, 
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Inclined E m placem ent (M5*GCPS*ECPS)
T his involves em placing th e  waste can ister in inclined boreholes, drilled in em place­
m en t drifts.T his em placem ent configuration is m ade use of in the Belgian reference 
concept [17] . T h is  concept has boreholes drilled a t an inclination of 45 degrees to  
th e  vertical, spaced a t 20m and containing 12 waste canisters. This schem e would 
m inim ize m ining relative to  vertical em placem ent, b u t inclined drilling feasibility  still 
would be an  uncertain ty .
3.22 H ost R ock (M6-GCP1)
T he selection of the  host rock is very crucial to  the design of a  geological repository, as 
the  rock mass is the  prim ary  natu ra l isolation barrier in such a facility. As discussed 
earlier, the  design of a  repository is site  specific. Hence, all im portan t dim ensions and 
system  barriers would change as a function of the  site  and consequently the host rock.
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Num erous rock masses have been evaluated for their su itab ility  for waste disposal. 
T he prom ising ones are discussed below.
3.22.1 Salt (M6-GCP1 *ECP3)
Historically, bedded salt deposits have received a great deal of consideration as poten­
tia l waste repository sites. T he basic argum ents presented for the favorable consider­
ation  of these rocks include, extrem ely  low w ater conten t, extrem ely  low porosity  and 
perm eability , high therm al conductiv ity  and the ability  of salt to anneal after frac­
tu ring , am ong others. Subsequent experim ents have shown th a t salt is susceptible 
to  large lithosta tic  loads, particularly , when the  em placem ent zone dep th  is as high 
as 800m, this susceptib ility  is in the  form  of creep [7]. T em peratu re  rise, fu rther en­
hances s tru c tu ra l instab ility  of a  salt repository. T he possibility  of fu tu re  repository 
inundation  is not ruled out com pletely. These findings have resulted  in a  waning of 
in terest in th is rock form ation.
3.22.2  G ranite ( M6-GCP1*ECP2)
G ran ite  has been considered a ttrac tiv e  as a host rock for a  geological repository for its 
unfissured sta te , s tru c tu ra l stability , low porosity and perm eability  and the  presence 
of very low na tu ra l m oisture. It is also less susceptible to  heat effects th an  bedded 
salts. G ranite  is also known for its rigidity  and radionuclide reten tion  capacity. Its 
rigidity  aids it in w ithstanding  m ost stresses, while the  radionuclde retention capacity  
helps it in holding on to m ost radioactive species th a t  could possibly em anate  out of 
a waste canister. In spite of all its advantages, g ran ite  has a relatively low therm al 
conductivity , which m akes it necessary for the waste canisters to  be placed farther 
a p a rt to  be in conform ance w ith the  areal power density  requirem ent of the  repository. 
This tran sla tes  to  g reater m ining and greater cost.
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3.22.3 Tuff (M6-GCP1*ECP1)
Tuffs are m ainly composed of pyroclastic m ateria l and have a volcanic origin. Some 70 
- 80% of this m ateria l is composed of glass. A lteration  in tuffaceous rock is abundant, 
especially since glass is therm odynam ically  m eta  stable, consequently resulting in the 
form ation of zeolites. Studies have shown th a t  the  dom inant a lte ra tion  process is 
devitrification. Tuffs are reported  to  have good sorbtive po ten tia l w ith regard to 
m ost radionuclides. T hey  also have favorable therm al and m echanical properties. 
These rocks exhibit a relatively high therm al conductivity. It has also been reported  
th a t, welded tu ff is stiffest norm al to  th e  bedding, while nonwelded tuff is stiffest 
parallel to  the bedding. R adiation  effects are  reported  to  be lim ited  to  the  very near 
field. Some of the  prom inent features of Tuff are e laborated  here under [2];
•  The creep resistan t properties of th is rock obviates the  need to  account for the 
weight of th e  overburden as a  lithosta tic  pressure.
•  Tuff re ta ins w ater in its m icroscopic pores, by v irtue  of its high m atric  po ten tial.
•  It provides for a vadose w ater chem istry, th a t  is in  geochem ical equilibrium .
•  It has a  high gas perm eability, thus allowing, exchange of a ir betw een the  repos­
itory  and th e  im m ediate  vicinity of th e  waste packages.
All the  above m entioned  features m ake tuff a  w orthy cand idate  host rock.
3.23 C anister Containm ent (M6*GCP3)
T he w aste canister is enclosed in ano ther container or an overpack/sleeve depending 
on th e  canister m ateria l and the  waste package being single or m ulti-barrier.
3.23.1 D isp osa l C ontainer (M6*GCP3*ECP2)
After the im m obilized w aste is transferred  to  the pour canister, it is tran spo rted  to 
the repository site  in a tran spo rta tion  cask. A t th is po in t, the  pour canister is placed
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in a disposal container, for final em placem ent in the borehole. T he function of the 
disposal container is to isolate the  pour canister from any possible accident during em ­
placem ent operations, in addition, it also acts as another engineered isolation barrier 
to  the  waste form , once em placed.
3.23.2  O verp ack /S leeve (M6*GCP3*ECP1)
T he fuction of a sleeve is lim ited  to  providing an additional isolation barrier for the  
w aste form , i t  is no t designed to  isolate th e  pour canister from  shock loading, as a 
consequence of an accident, during em placem ent operations.
3.24 Buffer M aterial (M6*GCP2)
As opposed to  w aste packages designed for salt repositories, a  buffer m ateria l/backfill 
is used in w aste packages designed for tuff. Functionally, th is backfill is for providing 
a  sorption layer capable of re ta rd ing  and lim iting  th e  m igration  of released radioactive 
species. Also, it is supposed to  preclude th e  presence of w ater in  the  vicinity of the  
em placed waste.
3.24.1 B en to n ite  (M6*GCP2*ECP1)
B atch sorption studies using ben ton ite  in tu ff ground w aters, ind icate  strong to  m od­
era te  re ta rda tion  of radioactive species. Also, when ben ton ite  comes in contact w ith 
an aqueous solution, it swells and, if confined, reduces the  flow [3]. Hence ben ton ite  
serves well as a radionuclide isolation barrier.
3.24.2 C em ent (M6*GCP2*ECP2)
C em ent would do well in sustaining an alkaline environm ent, consequently reducing 
corrosion. However, it  does not exhib it good sorption capacity.
52
3.25 W aste Canister (M7-GCP1)
This is a  p rim ary  engineered isolation barrier. It is second in sequence to the glass 
m atrix  in the  case of im m obilized waste and the sam e in sequence to  th e  fuel cladding 
in the  case of spent fuel. Its s truc tu re , dim ensions and geom etrical features are a 
function of the inpu t from  the  appropriate  decision nodes as depicted  in M odule
7. T he optional elem ental p rocesses/m ethods, th a t need to  be decided upon are as 
discussed below.
3.26 Spent Fuel (M7-GCP2)
Spent fuel is as defined under section 1.4. D epending on th e  na tu re  of the  fission 
reactor, the  characteristics of spent fuel vary, which include, th e  dim ensions, degree 
of burnup  and therm al loading per fuel assembly. T he types of popu lar reactors th a t 
constitu te  U.S. nuclear operations, are the  Pressurized W ater R eactor (PW R ) and 
the  Boiling W ater R eactor (B W R ).
3.26.1 E ncapsu lated  (M7-GCP2*ECP2)
T hese fuel assem blies are disposed s ta tu s  quo, w ithout affecting any m odifications to  
its struc tu re .
3.26.2  U nencapsu lated  (M7-GCP2*ECP1)
Individual fuel rods are consolidated by disassem bling th e  fuel assembly. Fuel rod 
consolidation enhances th e  volum e u tilization  of the  spent fuel package.
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3.26.3 H om ogeneous ( M7-GCP2*ECP1)
Fuel assemblies originating from  one type of reactor are exclusively stored in each of 
such spent fuel waste canisters, e ither P W R  or BW R. These fuel assemblies are either 
consolidated or in tac t.
3.26.4 H ybrid  (M7*GCP3)
Fuel assemblies orig inating from  either type of reacto r are stored in the sam e spent 
fuel waste canister. However, in  th is case, the  fuel rods are required to  be in the  form  
of in tac t fuel assem blies [2].
Fuel A ssem bly ( M 7*G C P3*EC P1)
This involves the  containm ent of only fuel assemblies, no skeletal p a rts  associated 
w ith spent fuel are  contained in th is concept.
Fuel A ssem bly and Skeletal Parts (M 7*G C P3*EC P2)
In this concept, fuel assem blies orig inating from  either of th e  two reactors and the 
skeletal parts  associated w ith  spent fuel are contained in a  single waste canister.
3.27 Im m obilized W aste (M7-GCP5)
This is the  high level w aste originating from  reprocessing operations, 
sequently im m obilized by achieving a phase conversion, as discussed 
generic concept/process in M odule 1.
3.28 M aterial Variants (M7*GCP4)
Perform ance characteristics of the  waste canisters greatly  vary as a function of the 
m aterials used in th e ir construction. This would suggest the  use of the  best available
which is sub­
in one of the
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m ateria l for the reference environm ent, however, it  is constrained by the reasonable 
realm  of economic reach. Hence, a com prom ise design has to  be devised, which would 
reasonably contain radioactive waste and be in conform ance with the cost factor.
3.28.1 S teel C oncept ( M7*GCP4*ECP2)
T he U.S. reference design for th e  waste canister is a  steel concept [25]. T he canis­
ters  are fabricated  from  an austen itic  stainless steel, typically  316L. I t m easures a 
m axim um  of 4.75m in length and 0.7m  in d iam eter. T he in ternal space fram e of a 
spent fuel canister, consists of a 1cm thick pigeon hole array  of 304 stainless steel with 
square receptacles, p lates and a pintle. T he reference design also has a 304 stainless 
steel overpack over th e  waste containing canister. M aterials evaluation studies have 
ranked the  low carbon steels very high, being reflective of their perform ance charac­
teristics and  cost benefits[20]. Specifically, 304L stainless steel, 316L stainless steel 
and 321L stainless steel. Essentially, this is a single barrier container and is designed 
based on the  carrier can concept.
3.28.2 C opper C oncept (M7*GCP4*ECP3)
This concept would involve the  use of copper an d /o r  copper based alloys exclr.-ively, 
or in com bination w ith  o ther possible cand idate  m ateria ls. N um erous copper based 
canister designs have been proposed. T he Swedish reference design for a waste can­
ister is a th ick  single walled copper container, w ith  an extrem ely  long estim ated  life 
[17]. T he m ain  advantage in considering copper as a possible container m ateria l is 
its therm odynam ic and kinetic  stability, which m akes it extrem ely  res is tan t to  an 
oxidizing environm ent. D a ta  from  existing n a tu ra l analogs, such as the  Keweenaw 
deposit in N orthern  M ichigan, have supported  these facts. Copper based m ultibarrier 
concepts have also been researched. One such concept, as proposed by th e  Copper 
D evelopm ent Association [22], involves centrifugally casting copper and an  alum inum  
bronze into a single walled canister. Such a concept would have alum inum  bronze
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providing elevated tem pera tu re  s treng th  for resistence to  creep deform ation under 
lithosta tic  and hydrostatic  loads and C opper providing the  required corrosion re­
sistance. Galvanic corrosion is a concern in th is concept, due to the  presence of a 
dissim ilar m etal boundary. A nother m ultibarrier copper alloy based canister design 
has been proposed. This has been discussed under O ption 3 of chapter IV.
3.28.3  T itan iu m  C oncept (M7*GCP4*ECP1)
T itan iu m  has been considered as a candidate  m ateria l for the nuclear w aste container 
since the  early  stages of canister developm ent. T he m ain  a ttrac tio n  of titan iu m  was 
its excellent resistance to  localized form s of corrosion under an ex trem e rad iation  en­
vironm ent. A single barrier, exclusively titan iu m  shell was considered earlier, b u t was 
scraped due to the  thickness requirem ents, as governed by s tru c tu ra l integrity. T hus 
a com bination package using a  th in  ex ternal shell of titan iu m  for corrosion resistance 
and  a  thick in ternal shell of steel for s treng th , was proposed, to  m eet bo th  require­
m ents in  a  cost effective m anner [25]. This design was devised p rim arily  for service 
below the  w ater tab le , where the  package is sub jec ted  to  a  high hydrostatic  head. 
Sim pler designs can be used if an u n sa tu ra ted  repository  environm ent is preferred.
3.28.4  S ingle Barrier (M7-GCP1*ECP1)
A single walled container would not essentially m ean a  single barriered  system . How­
ever, the  canister itself would be m ade of a  single m ateria l, which could possibly be 
inserted  in ano ther container ( Carrier Can Concept). T he m ain advantages of a  sin­
gle barrier can ister are, ease of fabrication, ease in  handling, low inventory and m ore 
accurate  predictive m odeling. Also, a single barrier can ister would be m uch less in 
cost, relative to  a  m u ltibarrier canister. T he m ain disadvantage of such a  system , is 
the lack of redundan t barriers.
3.28.5 M ultibarrier C oncept ( M7-GCP1*ECP2)
This concept uses m ultip le canister barriers to  isolate and contain the  radionuclides. 
A single walled container, can not be categorized exclusively as a single barrier canis­
ter, as the canister wall can be m ade of two m eta l shells, m ade possible by centrifugal 
casting, as discussed earlier. However, the  converse in not true. T he basis for pro­
viding m utlibarriers is the  concept of redundan t design. This is done in an effort to 
account for the  uncertain ties th a t  exist in long term  nuclear w aste disposal.
C hap ter 4 
Id en tification  and  A n a lysis  o f  
O ptional F low  P ath s
Flow pa th s  th a t offer prom ising nuclear waste m anagem ent m ethods, need to  be 
identified and charted  on th e  Decision Tree. M ethods of waste m anagem ent envisaged 
to  be charted  can not be perceived to  be prom ising in all situations. Hence, some 
decision inpu t is needed to  pursue such an identification. To th is end, two scenarios 
will be defined and their respective flow paths identified and charted  on the  Decision 
Tree. T hey  are defined as follows;
4.1 SC EN A R IO  1
Spent fuel inventory is burgeoning at onsite in terim  w aste storage facilities. Uncer­
ta in ty  in achieving a  final deposition and inadequacy of existing storage facilities, 
have necessitated  the  need for an a lte rna te  flexible disposal schem e, preferably on­
site. Several vendors, have responded by designing flexible onsite storage schemes. 
Schemes, which aid in capacity  enhancem ent of existing storage facilities have also 
been proposed. All these possibilities are accounted for in the  sub ject Decision Tree.
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T heir process features have been discussed in detail in the preceding chapter. This 
scenario initiates option 1.
4.1.1 O P T IO N  1
All the  concepts, m ethods, processes and technologies categorized under M odule 2 
are pertinen t to  the  scenario presented in th is option. These are used in a three 
tie r scheme. Existing facility enhancem ent m ethods would be the  first choice. If 
for reason, they  are  perceived to  be unsuitable, flexible disposal m ethods w ith a  low 
capital cost would be considered. M ethods involving the  construction of facilities 
sim ilar to  existing facilities would be the  last choice. Significant storage capacity 
can be developed by existing facility enhancem ent m ethods, such as R eracking and 
Fuel Rod Consolidation, as discussed in th e  preceding chapter and bearing flow paths 
M 2-G CP4-ECP1, M 2-G CP4-EC P2 respectively. An increase of as m uch as 200 % 
in storage capacity  is possible when these two m ethods are used in  series. A bout 
the  only m ajor constra in t th a t lim its th is m ethod  is the  s truc tu ra l s tab ility  of the 
storage facility. Fuel criticality  is also considered to  be a problem  w ith  th is  m ethod. 
However, it can be addressed by the  use of neu tron  absorbing storage cell walls. Con­
struction  of supplem ental w ater pools is no t considered to  be a ttrac tiv e  anym ore, due 
to  high in itial cap ital cost which can not be justified  in the  light of an uncerta in  waste 
m anagem ent scenario. This has resulted in a  concrete departu re  from  a facility with 
inbuilt accom m odation for fu tu re  storage. M odular storage and expansion designs 
have been perceived to  be m ore appropriate  for the subject situation . These are typ ­
ically, dry  storage concepts, as elaborated  in the  preceding chapter and bearing the 
flow paths M 2-G C P3 , M S-G CP5, M 2-GCP6.
T he Nuclear R egulatory Commission (N RC) has developed requirem ents for siting 
and design of onsite storage facilities. The NRC term s these facilities as Independent 
Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) and has incorporated  th e  sub ject require­
m ents in the code of federal regulations as 10 C FR  P art 72. T he dry storage technolo­
59
gies m entioned above will be subjected  to a quan tita tive  analysis, based on criteria  
derived from these NRC requirem ents. T he intention of this quantification is to  de­
velop a basis for com parative conclusions. Please note th a t  this comparison would 
be lim ited  to  dry storage technologies discussed under this option. The rationale for 
such a lim ita tion  is partly  due to  N R C ’s view of onsite storage as being significantly 
different as com pared to  o ther alternatives, such as disposal in a m ined repository. 
T he fact th a t NRC has different requirem ents for each of these alternatives is reason 
for such an in terp re ta tion . This would obviously preclude a plausible comparison. 
This is also due to  the  need to  seek flexible technologies, as explained earlier.
Quantification
Q uantify ing the  d a ta  and inform ation presented on dry  storage technologies will in­
volve th e  use of a m ulti dim ensional m atrix  approach. As p a rt of th is approach, a 
ranking  schem e will be defined based on criteria  derived from  regulations discussed 
earlier. T he c riteria  so developed will be weighted individually  as a function of their 
value in a  robust containm ent design. T he technology under quantification will be 
ranked for each of th is criterion and the  results tabu la ted  in a rank  scale m atrix . 
C om parative conclusions on technologies subjected  to  quantification will be a func­
tion of th e ir to ta l score, derived from  the  rank scale m atrix . As discussed, the criteria  
on which the  rank scale m atrix  will be based are derived from  NRC 10 C F R  P a rt 72. 
Specifically , from 72.104, 72.122(h), 72.124, 72.126 and 72.128. They are as follows:
C r i t i c a l i t y  : This derived from  72.124. For any high level waste containm ent an d /o r 
storage system , the  need to  m ain ta in  a subcritical waste m ass through out its design 
life is of u tm ost im portance. This is well substan tia ted  by the  regulatory need to 
realize a  design to  preclude a  nuclear criticality  accident unless a t least two unlikely, 
independen t and concurrent or sequential changes occur in the  conditions essential to 
nuclear criticality  safety. Hence, appropriate  criticality  control is to  be provided by 
e ither incorporating a neutron poison or a favorable geom etry or both. W hen used, 
a  positive m eans to  verify the  continued efficacy of a neutron  poison is required. Due
its im plications, this criterion is weighted the highest.
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S t r u c tu r a l  I n te g r i ty  : This derived partly  from  72.122. Since the in tegrity  of the 
stru c tu re  containing the sub ject waste is key to  safe storage, th is criterion is one 
am ong the  highly weighted. The containm ent s tru c tu re  is required to w ithstand the 
worst postu la ted  n a tu ra l event of several phenom ena, such as earthquake, tornado, 
flood and a  hurricane. It is also needed to  accom m odate th e  possibility of a  credible 
fire or explosion, thus requiring the  use of non com bustible m aterials in the  design. 
S truc tu ra l com ponents of confinem ent barriers th a t are inherent to nuclear waste, 
such as fuel cladding are required to  be p ro tected  from  degradation during storage. 
T he design is also required to  preclude all possibilities of nuclear waste tran spo rt into 
an underground w ater body.
S h ie ld in g  : This is derived from  72.126, 72.104 and 72.106. T his criterion is also in 
the  sam e category as criterion 2, w ith regards to  its weight. This is well supported  
by the  fact th a t high rad ia tion  dosage is fata l to  living tissue. Shielding is required 
to  be achieved by establishing a controlled area. T he m inim um  distance from  the  
w aste storage installation to  the  nearest boundary  of th e  controlled area being 100 
m eters. Further, the  insta lla tion  is required to  com ply w ith a restriction on norm al 
operational exposure to  any individual beyond th e  controlled area, which being, 25 
m rem  for th e  whole body, 75 m rem  for the  thyro id  and 25 m rem  to  any o ther organ 
in a single year. W hile the  dosage restric tion  for a single design basis accident is as 
low as 5 m rem  to the whole body or any o ther organ. T he installation is also required 
to  lim it rad iation  exposure of onsite personnel.
H e a t  D is s ip a t io n  : This derived partly  from  72.128. T he fact th a t nuclear waste 
em its significant am ounts of energy in the form  of hea t, points to  the  im portance of 
positive heat dissipation by the  storage insta lla tion . T he  subject NRC regulations 
do not have specific requirem ents in this regard. However, there  is a m ention of a 
need for such a  provision. It is required to  be reliable enough to be consistent w ith
its im portance to  safety. This affords considerable flexibility to the designer, allowing 
him to base his design on the specific requirem ents and lim itations of the applied con­
cept and com ponents. This criterion is weighted reasonably high, as it is considered 
im portan t to  the  safety of the  installation.
M o n ito r in g  : This derived partly  from  72.122(b), 72.122(h) and 72.126. M onitoring 
is key to the  successful functioning, design evaluation and evolution of th e  storage in­
stallation. In general, the subject regulations require the design to  be capable enough 
to  m onitor com ponents im portan t to  safety. Specifically, storage confinem ent system s 
are required to  be m onitored in real tim e to  determ ine and effect corrective actions, 
when needed. F u rther, a  provision for m onitoring efHuents and rad iation  are also 
required, so as to  establish operational restric tions to  m eet As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable (A L A R A ) objectives and be in com pliance w ith regulatory  restrictions.
R e t r ie v a b i l i ty  : This is based on 72.122(h)(5) and 72.122(1), since th e  technologies 
being evaluated are designed for in term ed ia te  storage as opposed to  being term inal. 
T he safe retrieval of th e  stored waste is im p o rtan t, hence, th e  design is required to 
incorporate storage logistics, th a t would allow retrieval w ithout a  w aste release or 
rad iation  exposure in excess of lim its specified in 10 C F R  P a r t 20.
M in im a l  W a s te  : This is based on 72.128(a)(5) and 72.130. D ue to  the  in term edi­
ate  natu re  of th e  ISFSI, it is im portan t to  realize th e  need to  m inim ize the  auxiliary 
waste, th a t would be associated w ith th is insta lla tion  when decom m issioned. Aux­
iliary waste would constitu te  all com ponents of th e  insta lla tion , th a t  can not be 
decontam inated w ith in a  reasonable econom ic threshold. Hence, the  insta lla tion  is 
required to  be designed to  m inim ize con tam inated  equipm ent and com ponents.
E s s e n tia l  R e q u i r e m e n ts  : This is derived from  72.122(k). All the  am enities th a t 
are needed to  susta in  th e  safe operation of th e  ISFSI, including power, w ater, air etc., 
constitu te  the essential requirem ents. Hence, the im portance of unceased sourcing of
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these am enities is obvious. Truly enough, sufficient backup is required in the design 
to  support a prim ary source m alfunction.
E a s e  o f  I n s ta l l a t io n  a n d  M a n u f a c tu r in g  ( E .I.M  ): A stream lined design ca­
pable of easing insta lla tion  and m anufacturing, would go a  long way in enhancing 
productiv ity  and cu tting  costs, both  during m anufacturing and in itial m obilization 
for insta lla tion . I t would even add to  the  safety of the  ISFSI, as a sim pler installation 
would result in fewer errors. T hough not prim ary  to  the  ISFSI’s design, it definitely 
would be a positive feature.
E c o n o m y  : T he need to  design a  cost effective ISFSI cannot be understa ted . How­
ever, the  n a tu re  of the  function such an insta lla tion  is required  to  perform  is overly 
safety specific. Hence, an econom ic benefit can not be achieved even by a slight am ­
plification of a po ten tia l risk, which is why th is criterion is w eighted low. This does 
not underm ine th e  possibility of achieving economic benefits by m anipu lating  the  
logistics of em placem ent, such as developing a  flexible, stream lined  design or cu tting  
in itia l cap ital costs, to  be consistent w ith apprehension abou t fu tu re  policy in this 
regard.
A q u an tita tiv e  analysis for each of the  dry  storage technologies discussed herein is 
conducted under here em ploying a  rank  scale m atrix  in each case. T he ranking regions 
in th is m atrix  are, 1-4 is defined to  be low, 5-8 is defined to  be m edium  and 9-10 is 
defined as high.
N U T E C H  M o d u le
T he physical a ttr ib u tes  of th is onsite storage installation are discussed under section 
3.9.1. I t  bears the  flowpath (M 2-G C P6-EC P 1 ) on the  Decision Tree. As can be seen 
from  the  rank  scale m atrix , T he Nutech m odule ranks low crite ria  5 and 10. It is 
ranked m edium  for criteria  1,4,7 and 9. W hile it scores high for crite ria  2,3,6 and
8. T he reason for a  m edium  rank  for criterion 1 is because the  N utech m odule uses
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burnup credit in its design. This makes it deviate from  a conservative approach. A 
low rank for criterion 5 is consistent w ith this technology’s inadequacy in m onitoring. 
C riterion 4 is ranked in the m edium  region, because of the  inability  of the  concrete 
H orizontal Storage M odule ( HSM) to  dissipate heat effectively, as no effort is m ade to 
augm ent th e  therm al conductiv ity  of concrete. T he rank for criterion 10 is m edium , 
as th is technology would not be com petitive in cost, unless an array of between two 
by five and two by te n  H SM ’s are built. Overall, th is onsite storage technology has 
scored 779 out of a  m axim um  possible score of 1000.
P SN  Ventilated Cask
This onsite  storage technology is discussed under section 3.10.2. I t  bears the  flow path 
(M 2-G C P7-ECP2) on the  Decision Tree. T he PSN  V entilated Cask ranks low for 
C rite ria  5 and 9. It ranks m edium  for 1,4,6,7,8 and  10. C riteria  2 and 3 rank 
high. C rite ria  1 is ranked  m edium  w ith  a score of 6, because th e  fuel density  in the  
storage cask is high and th e  only m ethod  used to  assure criticality  control is op tim um  
fuel geometry. C riterion 5 is ranked  in th e  high end of the  low region, as a  lim ited  
m onitoring  capability  is provided in th is technology. C riterion 9 is ranked sim ilar to  5, 
due to  a relatively complex design, specifically, th e  a ir flow p a th  through th e  cask and 
th e  logistics of handling and p lacem ent. Econom ic benefits and flexibility relative to  
th e  N utech m odule, assures a  rank  in the  high end of the  m edium  region for criterion 
10. T he  ability  of the  PSN  ven tila ted  cask to  expend m inim um  resources during in itia l 
m obilization transla tes  in to  economic benefits. Overall, th is onsite storage technology 
has scored 680 out of a m axim um  possible score of 1000.
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R a n k  S c a le  M a t r ix  ( N U TE C H  Module)
C r i te r ia W e ig h t '
(percent)
M e r i t 1 S c o re
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Criticality 20 X 140
Structural Integrity 15 X 150
Shielding 15 X 135
Heat Dissipation 13 X 91
M onitoring 8 X 16
Retrievability 8 X 80
M inim al Waste 8 X 64
Essential Requirem ents 5 X 50
E .I .M 5 X 35
Econom y 3 X 18
T o ta l  S c o re 779
B  &  W  C o n s ta r  M o d u le
This onsite storage technology is discussed under section 3.10.1. It bears the  flow 
p a th  (M 2-G C P7-EC P1 ) on the  Decision Tree. T he  rank  scale m atrix  has C riteria  1 
and 9 ranked in th e  lower end of the  m edium  region. W hile, criterion 5 is ranked in 
th e  lower end of the low region. C riteria  2,3,4,6,7,8 and 10 are ranked in the  high 
region. From the sum m ary it is obvious th a t th e  B & W  C onstar m odule has been 
ranked high for m ost of the  criteria. Also, it can be seen th a t criterion 5 is ranked low, 
which is reflective of this technology’s inadequacy in m onitoring. W hile, criterion 1
'Estimated based on interpretation of pertinent regulations
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is ranked at the low end of the m edium  region, because th is m odule holds as many 
as 32 in tact PVVR fuel assemblies in the absence of neu tron  poisons. A high rank for 
criterion 4 is reflective of this storage m odule’s efficiency in dissipating decay heat. 
A notable feature of this m odule is the use of m etallic aggregates in the  exterior 
concrete shell to  enhance the therm al conductivity  of this shell. As evidenced by the 
rank scale m atrix , th is storage m odule has an overall score of 785 out of a m axim um  
possible score of 1000.
Rank Scale M atrix (P S N  Ventilated Cask)
Criteria W eight2
(percent)
M erit2 Score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Criticality 20 X 120
Structural Integrity 15 X 135
Shielding 15 X 135
Heat Dissipation 13 X 78
M onitoring 8 X 32
Retrievability 8 X 56
M inim al Waste 8 X 40
Essential Requirements 5 X 40
E .I .M 5 X 20
Econom y 3 X 24
Total Score 680
2 Estimated based on interpretation of pertinent regulations
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Rank Scale M atrix ( B & W  Constar Module)
Criteria W eight3
{percent)
M erit3 Score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Criticality 20 X 120
Structural Integrity 15 X 135
Shielding 15 X 135
Heat D issipation 13 X 117
M onitoring 8 X 16
Retrievability 8 X 72
M inim al W aste 8 X 80
E ssential Requirem ents 5 X 50
E .I .M 5 X 30
Econom y 3 X 30
Total Score 785
Conclusions for Scenario 1
In general, onsite waste storage obviates the need for a  m ajo r tran spo rta tion  oper­
ation, consequently reducing th e  sho rt term  risk of waste m anagem ent significantly. 
O nsite storage is by far the  m ost cost effective m ethod of waste m anagem ent. It 
is based on the  conceptual decision of pursuing a decentralized waste m anagem ent 
scheme. Some apprehension exists in pursuing such a scheme. T he dry storage 
schemes have been discussed in detail in chap ter 3 and they  have been thoroughly 
analyzed bo th  qualitatively  and quan tita tive ly  in th is section. Of the three storage
3Estimated based on interpretation of pertinent regulations
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concepts th a t have been evaluated, the B&W  C onstar m odule ranked the highest with 
a score of 785, the  N utech m odule lagged m arginally  with a score of 779. W hile, the 
PSN V entilated Cask was significantly lower w ith a score of 680. Hence, if an onsite 
storage concept is pursued, the B&W  C onstar M odule is recom m ended, prim arily 
due to  i t ’s sim plicity, low cost, low m ain tenance and good shielding characteristics.
4.2 SC EN A R IO  2
The longevity of radionuclide toxicity m akes a search to  seek a  m ethod  to  term inally  
dispose nuclear waste, im perative. Of the  m any proposed m ethods, the  concept of 
achieving term ina l disposal by em placing th e  nuclear waste in a  m ined geological 
repository, has been selected as the reference technology. This concept is discussed 
under section 3.20 in th e  preceding chap ter. T he p rim ary  containm ent system  in a 
repository is the  waste package. Hence two different w aste package concepts are being 
evaluated here. O ption  2 and option 3 are in itia ted  by th is scenario.
4.2.1 O P T IO N  2
This option suggests the use of a single barrier can ister in term inally  disposing nuclear 
waste in a geological repository. T he U.S reference design for th is w aste canister, 
adequately conforms w ith the subject scenario. T his design has been m ade a part 
the Decision Tree. It has been discussed in the preceding chapter under an E lem ental 
C oncep t/P rocess, title d  steel concept, bearing  the  flow path M 7-G CP4-ECPS.
4.2.2 O P T IO N  3
This option suggests the use of a m ulti barrier can ister to  term inally  dispose nuclear 
waste in a geological repository. This scenario has also been incorporated  in the  Deci­
sion Tree. However, a  m u lti barrier can ister design, different from  w hat was discussed 
as part of th e  Decision Tree, is being proposed here.
6S
T he proposed waste containm ent schem e is a  m ulti-barrier, vertically em placed, copper- 
nickel alloy system . It has a Cu-Ni 70/30  (CDA 715) ou ter shell, a  nickel base(Incalloy  
825) inner shell and an oxidic nonconducting sandwich layer between the  two m etal 
alloy shells, which could be cem ent concrete or alumina. T he inner and ou ter shells 
are provided w ith lifting collars for facilita ting  th e ir handling. T he lifting collars 
are m ade of a relatively electronegative elem ent, such as m agnesium  or aluminum. 
T his configuration would m ake the  containm ent system  cathodically protected  as the 
lifting collars would also act as sacrificial anodes because of their electronegativity . 
An a lte rn a te  design would utilize a th readed  socket welded to  the  head. This socket 
would accept a high streng th  steel p in tle  during p lacem ent. In th is way the  use of an 
expensive forged pintle  for each container is avoided. A t th e  tim e  of final disposal, a 
th readed  m agnesium  sacrificial anode is placed into th e  socket. T he crite ria  for the 
selection of the  canister m aterials are :
•  Incalloy 825  is an austen itic  alloy designed for use in  ex trem ely  corrosive envi­
ronm ents. This alloy is stab ilized  w ith  titan iu m  to  resist in terg ranu lar corrosion 
and  in terg ranu lar stress corrosion cracking. T he  nickel content m akes it  very re­
sis tan t to  transg ranu lar stress corrosion cracking. M olybdenum  and copper give 
th is alloy resistance to  p ittin g  and  stress corrosion, while th e  high chrom ium  
content gives it resistance to  various types of oxidizing environm ents [20].
•  C om pared to pure copper, Cu-Ni 70/30  has excellent engineering properties 
in all im portan t categories and is one of the  few alloys on the  priority  list of 
cand idate  m etal alloys for the  canister. C em ent is to  be gunnited  onto the inner 
surface of the  Cu-Ni shell and cured prior to  placem ent. This barrier provides
-  Insu lation  between dissim ilar m etal alloys.
-  Im proves crash streng th  of th e  ou ter canister
-  Im proves the corrosion resistance of the  shell by providing a high pH  en­
vironm ent.
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•  Concrete retains its stab ility  a t relatively high tem peratures(300°C '), which can 
be fu rther enhanced by using high alumina cement. It creates a passive envi­
ronm ent, due its basicity thus retard ing  the corrosion m echanism . High lime 
concrete has the  ability  to heal cracks under aqueous conditions.
T he th ird  of the above criteria  can be elaborated  by looking at the  Pourbaix diagram. 
Pourbaix  describes the  chemical behavior of m etals in w ater on a potential-vs-pH  m ap. 
In general th ree areas are observed.
•  Im m un ity  : In here, the m etal is therm odynam ically  stable.
•  P assivity : In here, corrosion occurs, b u t produces an insoluble product.
•  Corrosion : In here, corrosion produces a soluble p roduct.
Simplified Pourbaix diagrams of copper and nickel are  presented here(fig. 4-1). As 
shown im m unity  occurs a t low potential, while corrosion occurs a t high pH. The 
p rac tica l im plications are obvious.
•  Alkalinity  contribu tes to  the  passivity  of the  m eta l, thus enhancing the  resis­
tance of the  system . This is am ply dem onstra ted  in reinforced concrete. Cem ent 
concrete will be an excellent choice in th is regard.
•  High lim e cem ent concrete heals cracks in an aqueous environm ent.
• S tructu res m ain tained  at a sufficiently low potential by a sacrificial anode are 
im m une  to  corrosion.
• From  the  evidence discussed above one m ight expect th a t an extrem ely  durable 
containm ent system  m ight be form ed, using corrosion resistan t alloys in an 
alkaline environm ent p ro tected  by sacrificial anodes.
T he im position of an electrical insulation barrier would m ean the  im position of a 
therm ally insulated barrier, which raises questions concerning the  adequacy of heat 
d issipation. Ostensibly, such questions can be addressed only by a thorough anal­
ysis of the  tem p era tu re  d istribu tion  w ithin the  containm ent vessel, as a  function of
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Figure 4.1: Simplified P ourba ix  d iagram s of Copper and Nickel
insulation type, thickness and boundary conditions. This analysis was done for the 
proposed m odel. However, it was not lim ited to the  proposed configuration. A few 
different sandwich layers with varying thicknesses were also considered. Further, the 
model was also evaluated by m odifying th e  logistics of insta lla tion . T he installation 
scheme was so m odified th a t  it would provide a  feature of retrievab ility  in the  pro­
posed design. T his m odification requires the external barriers of the  waste canister to 
be positioned afte r 50 years of the em placem ent of the in ternal shell. Hence, this two 
stage em placem ent system  would be achieved by vertically em placing a single barrier 
Incalloy 825 cylindrical canister in the borehole of an em placem ent drift, followed by 
a 50 year period to  allow for canister retrievability  and heat d issipation. A fter the  50 
year period, an ex ternal C u /N i (CDA 715) shell gunnited  w ith  cem ent concrete as 
discussed earlier is positioned on the  sub jec t canister, based on a  decision to  term i­
nally isolate the  nuclear waste. If decided otherw ise, the  canister is retrieved.
System  M odelling and Analysis
T he prediction of tem p era tu re  deposition in the ex ten t of a  m ined geological reposi­
tory  would am ount to  a th ree  dim ensional tran sien t heat transfer problem , involving 
intensive com putation  when handled num erically  [23]. A waste package em placem ent 
depth  of 300 m  below grade w ith a  horizontal m atrix  spacing of 8m x 30m and an 
initial un it therm al load of 4740 W, constitu tes the system  description. T he model 
assum es the variation of tem pera tu re  in a singular barrier of the  m ulti-barrier canister 
to  be sim ilar to  th a t of a uni-barrier canister. This allows th e  use of p e rtin en t tem per­
a tu re  d a ta  developed by therm al analysis of th e  reference w aste package design (steel 
concept)[12] [11] [28] . T he use of a steady s ta te  one dim ensional tem p era tu re  profile 
in the waste package barrier is justified by speculating a  m inim al tem poral response 
to an elem ental tem p ara tu re  variation in the  subject barrier rela tive  to  the bore hole 
rock m ass. T he slender geom etry  of the  waste package (Height - 4-75m, D iam eter -
0.71m) assures the  dissipation of m ost heat radially. Hence, neglecting longitudinal 
heat dissipation is considered reasonable. T his allows the  therm al m odelling of the
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Figure 4.2: Spent Fuel un it therm al o u tp u t, Source: Modified fro m  G .L. Johnson, 
D .N .M ontan , Therm al calculations pertaining to a proposed Yucca m ountain  nuclear 
repository, R ef[12]
w aste package as a  free convective and rad ia tive  transport th rough vertical concen­
tric  cylinders w ith  a  p rim ary  h ea t deposition in the inner m ost cylinder. T he air 
gap betw een the bore hole wall and the  ex terio r barrier of th e  w aste package is being 
tre a te d  as a rec tangu lar cavity  due to  lack of d a ta  on heat transfer coefficients in 
annu lar spaces.
T he  first approx im ation , is th a t ,  th e  heat convection coefficient m ay be obtained , 
from  correlation proposed by Globe and Dropkin[\Sf\.
have =  0.069 .R a l .P ° 074. j  (4.1)
where
have Average heat convection coefficient 
R a i  Raleigh number
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Figure 4.3: T ransien t tem p era tu re  a t waste package interfaces, Source: R.L.Skaggs, 
S.M oujaes, Y.Lei, V .V.G opal, Therm al and metallurgical considerations o f a novel 
design fo r  the nuclear waste container, Ref[2S]
P r  Prandtl number
k  Heat conductivity o f  the air
L  Thickness o f  the air gap ,m
All th e  p roperties  are  evaluated  a t average tem p era tu re  of th e  two surfaces. T he heat 
transfer ra te  across th e  air gap can be calculated  as
Q g  —  Q c o n v  +  Q r a d  (4-2)
T he heat generating  ra te  being, Q g =  4740W , which is in itia lly  a  decaying function
w ith tim e(/i<7ure4). W hile, the  heat transfer ra te  for convection, Q COnv is
Qconv = haue.A .(T Sti — Tavc) (T3)
and the heat transfer rate for radiation, Q r a d is
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(4.4)
where
TSil Temperature o f the outer container surface , K
TSj2 Temperature o f the borehole wall, K
Tave Average temperature o f the air gap --,1- - , K
Surface area o f  the outer shell wall, to 2 
£1,62 E m issivities o f the two wall surfaces
cr Stefan-Boltzm ann constant 5 .67xl0~8 ~irfc4
From  the  heat transfer ra te  equation across the air gap, we can find the  tem p era tu re  a t 
the  ou ter shell. T he equation is non-linear a id the  iterative method o f bisection  is used 
to  com pute the  tem p era tu re  of the  ou ter shell surface. A fter th is tem p era tu re  is found, 
the  rest of the container layer surface tem p era tu re  can be c a lcu la ted (/f5 u re 4 .3 ), from 
th e  heat conduction equation.
%  = --------
T he second phase of the  m ulti-barrier container design is to  place concrete layers and 
to  fill the  air gap after 50 years of em placem ent. I t  was found th a t the  heat flux is 
low enough, th a t th e  ou ter shell tem p era tu re  will no t rise significantly above its value 
after the initial 50 years. A lthough, heat transfer through the container is m ainly by 
conduction. (figure 4-4) shows the results of different tem pera tu re  profiles, when a 
param etric  variation of concrete thickness is m ade.
T he above analysis shows th a t the  m axim um  tem p era tu re  fell as a function of the 
thickness of the  sandwich layer. It also confirmed a tem pera tu re  drop, when a  m ate ­
rial of higher therm al conductiv ity  was used as a  sandwich. A quantification of the 
above observations could result in several scenarios. These scenarios would be based
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Figure 4.4: T ransient tem p era tu res  as a  function of sandwich thickness, Source: 
R.L.Skaggs, S.M oujaes, Y .Lei, V.V.G opal, Therm al and metallurgical considerations 
o f a novel design fo r  the nuclear waste container, Ref[2S]
on the m axim um  therm al o u tp u t of th e  canister, th e  thickness of the  sandwich layer 
and the  sandwich layer m ateria l. By using a worst case m axim um  therm al ou tpu t 
of 4740 W  and a 10 cm th ick  a lum ina  cem ent concrete, th e  m axim um  tem peratu re  
of the  inner shell was found to  be 230°C. This tem p era tu re  has been found to be 
innocuous to  the  in tegrity  of concrete [lj. Thus the  proposed configuration would be 
robust and stab le  in effectively isolating nuclear waste. In sum m ary, the  proposed 
configuration would bear the  p a th  M 7-G C P4-EC P3 , which transla tes  in to  a disposal 
schem e involving a  m ined  geological repository w ith Tuff as a  host rock and canisters 
vertically em placed in boreholes in em placem ent drifts. T he spacing of boreholes and 
the  em placem ent drifts is beyond the  scope of th is study. However, it needs to be 
s ta ted  th a t such a  spacing would be a function of th e  sub jec t can ister’s configuration 
and the allowable areal power density.
A comprehensive quantitative analysis will be conducted for the technologies discussed 
under option '2 and option 3. This is intended to establish the relative credibility o f
IRO.OOO - 
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Figure 4.5: Proposed M ulti-barrier C anister Design.
either of the two sub ject technologies. The sam e m ulti dim ensional m atrix  approach 
as used earlier, will be em ployed. However, the c riteria  will be derived from the 
regulations governing the siting  and general design of a m ined geological repository, 
which is incorporated in the  code of federal regulations as 10 C F R  P art 60.
Q u a n t if ic a t io n
Q uantifying the d a ta  perta in ing  to  the  subject waste package concepts will involve 
the  definition of criteria  as a first step, followed by the  form ulation of the rank  scale 
m atrix . A sum m ary of the  results w ith adequate justification  will be the  final step of 
th is quantification. C rite ria  perta in ing  to  scenario 2 are defined as follows: 
C r i t i c a l i ty  : This is derived from  60.131(b)(7). T he basic criticality  control c riteria  
rem ain  the sam e from w hat is required of an onsite storage installation . However, the 
design criteria  is m ore conservative as the calculated  effective m ultip lication factor 
{kef f )  is required to  be sufficiently below un ity  to  show a t least a  5 % m argin  after 
allowing for contingencies. C riticality  control is weighted high for obvious reasons.
S t r u c t u r a l  I n te g r i t y  : T his is derived m ostly from  60.131(b), 60.135 and partly  
from 60.133(h). T he w aste package is required to  be designed such th a t  the  insitu  
chemical, physical and nuclear properties of the waste package and its in teractions do 
not com prom ise its function. T he s tru c tu ra l in tegrity  of th e  w aste package is required 
to be evaluated for such factors as therm al loads, corrosion, m echanical s treng th  and 
rad iation  dam age. T he use of com bustibles and chem ically reactive m aterials is not 
perm itted . T he waste package is needed to  be stu rdy  enough to sustain  waste contain­
m ent during tran spo rta tion , em placem ent and retrieval. Adverse an tic ipated  n a tu ra l 
phenom enon such as earthquakes and repository sa tu ra tion , are required to be consid­
ered. More im portan tly , the  repository  is required to  achieve substan tia lly  com plete 
containm ent for not less th an  300 years and not m ore th an  1000 years following p e r­
m anent closure.
T h e r m a l  L o a d s  : This is derived from  60.135 and 60.133. T he waste package is
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required to  be designed by considering the  effects of therm al loads applied by the 
decaying waste. Specifically, the  predicted  therm al and therm o-m echanical response 
of the host rock, the  surrounding s tra ta  and the ground w ater system  to the heat 
em anating  out of the  waste package is required to  be considered. T he heat ou tpu t 
of the waste package needs to  be optim al w ith regards to the above m entioned fac­
tors. This is weighted reasonably high, as the in tegrity  of the  repository would be 
jeopardized w ithout an optim al heat o u tp u t from  each waste package. H eat ou tpu t 
would be op tim al in  the  region constrained by m axim um  allowable heat w ith regard 
to  s tru c tu ra l in teg rity  and m inim um  required heat to preclude condensation.
S h ie ld in g  : This is derived from  60.111. As the  waste package would be em placed in 
a  deep m ined repository, the shielding requirem ents on the  w aste package are based 
m ore on th e  idea of shielding personnel during em placem ent, th an  on final storage. 
T he rad iation  levels are  an tic ipated  to  be substan tia lly  below th e  regulatory  lim it. 
T he waste package is required to  com ply w ith the  lim its specified in  10 C F R  P a rt 20.
R e t r i e v a b i l i ty  : T h is is derived from  60.111(b) and 60.131(c). T he  w aste package 
is required to  be designed to  preserve the  option of waste retrieval, s ta rtin g  a t any 
tim e upto  50 years after waste em placem ent operations are in itia ted . F u rther, a  rea­
sonable schedule is defined as one th a t would perm it retrieval in abou t th e  sam e tim e 
as th a t  devoted to  construction  of the  repository  and em placem ent of wastes. This is 
weighted high enough to  be consistent w ith the concept of flexible design.
E a s e  o f  I n s ta l l a t io n  a n d  M a n u fa c tu r in g  ( E .I .M ):  The benefits of a w aste pack­
age th a t wold be easy to  install and m anufacture, are obvious. Such a  design would 
allow fewer errors during insta lla tion , lower m anufacturing costs and enhance the 
quality  of m anufactu red  com ponents. All these benefits tran sla te  in to  higher safety 
for the waste package. This criterion is weighted low as it is not prim ary  to  waste 
package design.
E c o n o m y  : As m entioned earlier, the  prim ary design function of the waste package 
is to  contain  and isolate waste. Hence, safety is prim eval to the  waste package. Thus 
a cost effective design in this case would be any design th a t would re ta in  adequate 
functionality  w ith a  reductionin  cost. This criterion can be adhered to  by developing 
a design th a t would allow m anufacturing  ease. Costs can also be reduced by em ­
ploying a concept of using m ateria l barriers focussed to  resist a singular degradation 
m echanism .
A q u an tita tiv e  analysis for each of the  subject waste package designs will be conducted 
under here em ploying a  rank  scale m atrix  in each case. T he ranking regions in th is 
m atrix  are, 1-4 is defined to  be low, 5-8 is defined to  be m edium  and 9-10 is defined 
as high.
Steel Concept
This w aste package concept is discussed under section 3.28.1. It bears the  flow pa th  
(M 7*G C P 4*E C P 2) on the  Decision Tree. C riterion 2 for th is concept is ranked in 
th e  m edium  region as its w aste canister is m ade of an austen itic  stainless steel. These 
steels are known to  be susceptible to  in tergranular, transg ranu lar and stress corrosion 
cracking. Also m anufactu ring  anom alies involving a higher carbon content, could lead 
to  sensitization. T he credibility  of an  austen itic  stainless steel based waste package 
has been verified for m ost an tic ipa ted  norm al and adverse s tru c tu ra l loads. However, 
the  long te rm  (m in im um  300 years) in tegrity  of the  waste package is a concern, due 
to  its susceptibiliy  to  various form s of corrosion. A m edium  rank for criterion 4 is 
justified due to  a  lack of an effective shielding m ateria l such as concrete, in the  design. 
This concept is very a ttrac tiv e  in economic term s. Also, the  sim plicity in this design 
would allow a  facile em placem ent of th e  waste package. T he high ranking of C riteria  
6 and 7 is consistent w ith these advantages. Overall, th e  steel concept has scored 872 
ou t of a  m axim um  possible score of 1000.
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R a n k  S c a le  M a t r ix  (Steel Concept)
C r i te r ia W e ig h t4
{percent)
M e r i t4 S c o re
1 2 3 1 5 6 7 8 9 10
Criticality 20 X 200
Structural Integrity 18 X 108
Therm al Loads 18 X 180
Shielding 14 X 98
Retrievability 14 X 126
E .I .M 8 X 80
Econom y 8 X 80
T o ta l  S c o re 872
M ulti-barrier Concept
The generic concept is discussed under section 3.28.5. It bears the  flow p a th  (M 7- 
G C P1*EC P2) on the  Decision Tree. However, the  physical a ttr ib u tes  of a novel 
design developed under this generic concept, are discussed in section 4.3. As can be 
seen from  th e  rank  scale m atrix , m ost c riteria  are ranked high for th is  design. The 
exceptions being c rite ria  6 and 7. T he la ter of the two has a  m edium  rank , as nickel 
based alloys such as incalloy 825 and  cupro-nickel are used in the  design. These alloys 
add significantly to  th e  cost. W hile, c rite ria  6 is ranked in the  m edium  region, due 
to a relative com plexity  in the novel design. For obvious reasons, th e  use of m ultip le 
barriers adds to  th e  complexity. C riteria  3 is ranked a t 9 because the  oxidic sandwich 
layer m ight ham per efficient heat dissipation. This concern is partially  addressed by 
the use of high alum ina cem ent in concrete. A high rank for criterion 2 is reflective
‘'Estimated based on interpretation of pertinent regulations
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of this design’s sturdiness. Incalloy 825 and cupro-nickel exhib it good structu ra l 
properties and excellent resistance to  corrosion. The sacrificial na tu re  of the  lifting 
collars add to the  in tegrity  of the design. Overall, this design has scored 942 out of a 
m axim um  possible score of 1000. T he high overall ranking of th is design is a ttribu ted  
to  its focus on functional criteria.
R a n k  S c a le  M a t r ix  (M ulti-Barrier Concept)
C r i te r ia W e ig h t5
(percent)
M e r i t 5 S c o re
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Criticality 20 X 200
Structural Integrity 18 X 180
Thermal Loads 18 X 162
Shielding 14 X 140
Retrievability 14 X 140
E .I .M 8 X 64
Econom y 8 X 56
T o ta l  S c o re 942
C o n c lu s io n s  fo r  S c e n a r io  2
W hen the concepts discussed under option 2 and option 3 are considered as a func­
tion of scenario 2, it can be s ta ted  th a t a  single barrier can ister would not adequately 
com ply w ith the  suggested conservative approach. I t is observed th a t , such a conser­
vative approach could be com plied w ith , only by a  provision of redundan t barriers in 
the canister. T he proposed design as discussed under option 3, strikes a  balance by 
being flexible. The canister is single barriered when em placed, bu t upgraded to be
5 Estimated based on interpretation of pertinent regulations
m ulti-barriered, when a  decision on the issue of retrievability  is m ade. This makes this 
design efficient in expending an optim al capital cost. Further, th is design offers ade­
quate  protection against corrosion by incorporating a unique sacrificial anode assisted 
cathodic pro tection  system . Also, the alkalinity of the cem ent concrete sandwich layer 
enhances the corrosion resistance of the canister m etals by inducing passivity. Q uan­
titatively , th e  m ulti-barrier concept ranked higher than  the  steel concept a t an overall 
score of 942, as evidenced from  the  respective rank scale m atrices. In sum m ary, it 
can be s ta ted  th a t the  design discussed under O ption 3, would be an excellent choice 
in isolating high level nuclear w aste in a  m ined geological repository.
S3
C hap ter 5 
C onclusions
Q uite a  few options are available in m anaging High Level W aste (H LW ). Depending 
on various technical, regulatory  and economic considerations, th e  H L W  can be:
•  T ransm uted.
•  Stored a t s ite  in  its p rim ary  phase.
•  Injected into deep geological form ations.
•  Im m obilized w ith  subsequent storage/disposal:
-  At site.
-  In a  m ined geological repository.
-  In a  subseabed environm ent.
•  Processed for isolation of the  m ost m obile and toxic radionuclides with their 
subsequent disposal in space.
T he choice of any one or some of the  above options in achieving effective waste m an­
agem ent would require an in dep th  study  of various factors associated w ith these 
options. Choosing m ore than  one option would com pound this s tudy  to  seeking the
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relations between those options. The Decision Tree is designed to aid such a study.
The Decision Tree, as devised and form ulated in chapters 2 and 3 has been used in 
arriving at the  three options, discussed under chapter 4. As sta ted  earlier, a scenario 
needs to  be defined in arriving at a particu lar option. A ppropriate  scenarios, were 
defined in arriving at these options. O f these th ree  options, the last option is being 
recom m ended for fu rther study. Substan tiation  as to  the  technical feasibility of such 
a  recom m endation has been provided in the  preceding chapter. A m ajor factor th a t 
points to  such a  recom m endation is the apparen t need to  adhere to the  reference 
nuclear waste m anagem ent/d isposal concept. In addition, it needs to  be s ta ted  th a t, 
such an apparen t need is no t associated w ith any regulations or design guidelines, bu t 
m ore of a  logical ex trapolation  of the  idea of refining existing technology by affording 
m inor m odifications. This avoids possible undoing of technology already developed 
beyond an economic threshold. Such a  possibility exists, b u t only if a m ethod or 
technology is found to  be in flagrant error under th e  circum stances. Hence, two of 
the  three proposed options were based on a single scenario, waste disposal in a  m ined 
geological repository.
Scenario 1 was based on seeking a  technology th a t  would alleviate the  im m ediate 
problem  of waste m anagem ent/d isposal a t existing nuclear reactors in operation. All 
the technologies discussed under option 1 comply w ith th is Scenario. However, some 
of these, specifically, the  dry storage technologies would com ply w ith a m ore con­
servative version of th is Scenario. Conservatism  in th is regard would m ean, onsite 
storage for a period of some 50 years and subsequent tran sp o rta tio n  in the sam e basic 
hardw are for term inal disposal. T he advantages of such an a lternative  are very many. 
As elaborated  in section 1.3, this Scenario would help resolve some unknowns by pos­
sible advances in technology. Unknowns such as, o ther possible waste m anagem ent 
technologies not explored yet and the perception of fissionable m ateria l {plutonium ) as 
waste or resource, in the light of the  absence of any feasible a lternative to fossil fuels. 
Pursuing a decentralized approach involving storage a t s ite  will reduce the short term
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risk of release during transporta th  in d  expend substantially  fewer resources.
M ost of the  m ethods and technologies th a t  conform with th is scenario could also 
be m ade to  serve as disposal m ethods, provided a consensus is reached am ongst the 
decision m akers in endorsing a decentralized approach. In sum m ary, it needs to be 
s ta ted  th a t  ano ther scenario can be defined and an appropriate  technology can be 
found on the  Decision Tree, if required.
Even though the m ined repository is considered to  be the curren t reference tech­
nology in the  w aste m anagem ent program , it is crucial to  consider and understand  
o ther possible alternatives. The im plications of evaluating th e  pros and cons of o ther 
a lternatives in relation  to  th e  reference concept are wide ranging. In this respect, 
th e  Decision Tree is envisioned to  serve as a  tool in  perceiving the  complex relations 
th a t  exist am ongst these alternatives. Further, the  Decision Tree would help in con­
ducting  a com prehensive analysis of the problem  of nuclear w aste m anagem ent. This 
would also serve as an excellent base for the  developm ent of a  com puter based expert 
system , which would be capable of advising in  choosing appropriate  waste disposal 
technology. Such a system  would require a com prehensive constrain t and relational 
database, needed to  support the  advising capability . T his fea tu re  is lacking in the  
sub jec t Decision Tree. F u ture  work could be d irected  towards establishing such a 
knowledge base.
M ore work can also be directed  towards th e  developm ent of a m ore specific design, 
relative to  the proposed m ulti barrier concept. T he proposed concept can be evaluated 
for its s tru c tu ra l stab ility , ease of handling and p lacem ent, and m anufacturing  ease. 
It can be refined appropriate ly  to  achieve optim um  perform ance objectives in this 
regard. N atural analogs also need to  be sought and evaluated to  enhance confidence 
in the  design.
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A p p en d ix  A  
A ltern a te  N u clear W aste  
M an agem en t T echnologies
A .l  C irculating P ip e  Storage
T he liquid nuclear waste exiting the  reprocessing operation  can also be stored in an 
insta lla tion , which comprises of pipe circuits containing th e  liquid radioactive m ate­
rial, m eans for circulating th e  liquid radioactive m ateria l around the  pipe circuits and 
m eans for circulating a  liquid cooling m edium  over th e  ex ternal surface of the pipe 
circuits [8].
These pipe circuits are e ither inserted  in a  tank  containing th e  liquid cooling m edium , 
or a lternatively , th e  cooling m edium  is m ade to pass through th e  annu lar gap between 
coaxial pipes, the  inner one of which contains the  radioactive m ateria l. T he circulation 
of th e  cooling m edium  through the annular space is achieved by the  operation of 
fluidic pum ps. These are controlled by an air pum p and opera ted  by a  liquid column. 
C ircu lating  pum p, secondary cooling system s are also provided to  sustain the flow 
of th e  cooling m edium  during a  prim ary  cooling system  m alfunction. The provision
of a  secondary cooling system  aids in controlling a rise in the tem p era tu re  of the 
radioactive m ateria l, which in tu rn  minimizes corrosion in pipes. Typically, a  reflux 
air condenser is provided on tanks sourcing the liquid m edium . This provision helps 
in preventing loss of any cooling m edium  in the event of a significant tem pera tu re  rise. 
The cooling m edium  could be water. However, for a  system  with a reflux condenser, 
a liquid with a  boiling poin t of 60°C - 80°C is used. This m edium  could be m ethanol, 
isoproponol, m ethylene chloride and o ther halogenated hydrocarbons.
A .2 E xtraterrestrial D isposal
Popularly  known as th e  space option, th is involves the  deploym ent of th e  nuclear 
waste m odule in space. T his option would not be feasible in disposing all of the  high 
level waste. However, a  few long lived and m obile radionuclides m ay be specifically 
isolated for ex tra  te rres tria l disposal. Essentially, th is would com plim ent te rrestria l 
disposal. This s tra tegy  is adequately  justified, as hazard  studies involving geologic 
pathw ay m odeling have shown th a t elem ents such as am ericium , curium , nep tun ium  
and technicium  con tribu te  significantly to  th e  long term  risk of geological disposal. 
T he selection of an  app rop ria te  w aste form  to  contain  these elem ents is im portan t. 
P aram eters considered for this selection include, therm ochem ical stability , toughness, 
high w aste loading, high therm al conductivity, fabrication, resistance to  leaching, 
shock and therm al oxidation. A waste form  w ith  uniform ly dispersed ceram ic pa r­
ticles in a  m etallic phase and based on iron, nickel and copper is being considered 
as a possibility, in th is s itua tion , as it positively conforms with m ost of the  above 
m entioned param eters. A typical e x tra  te rrestria l disposal scheme would com prise of 
th e  following phases.
•  N uclear waste processing and payload fabrication.
•  N uclear w aste ground tran spo rt.
•  Payload p repara tion  a t launch site.
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Figure A .l: Configuration of the  Space Shu ttle  Loaded w ith an OTV, Source: W. 
Perlich, Space disposal o f  nuclear wastes, Ref[21]
• P re-launch activities.
• Space sh u ttle  operations.
T he equipm ent th a t would be associated with such an operation  would include an 
uprated  space shu ttle , a  reusable O rbit Transfer Vehicle ( OTV  ), and an expendable 
propellant storage vehicle. T he shu ttle , OTV and the  nuclear payload configuration, 
is as depicted  in fig. 3.5
Space disposal would pose a lower long term  risk to hum an civilization, relative to 
terrestria l disposal, b u t short te rm  risks a t the  launch to orb it phase and the early 
deploym ent phase are too great to  be ignored. These risks can be m anaged by pro­
viding for failures and by op tim al system s planning. It has been reported  th a t the
ex tra  terrestria l disposal of selected radionuclides, would result in a surcharge of 0.10 
m ils/K w h to users of electricity [13] . T hus, this option is economically viable, con­
sidering the drop in the  long term  risk in isolating these m obile radionuclides.
A .2.1 H eliocentric O rbit
Several space destinations have been considered, including injection into the  sun, 
solar system  escape, p lacem ent in a high E arth  o rb it, deploym ent into a stable he­
liocentric o rb it and placem ent on the m oon or into a  lunar o rb it. Of all the  above, 
the  one requiring waste deploym ent in a  stable solar o rb it, has been chosen as the  
reference concept. This involves the  injection of the  w aste m odule into a  circular 0.85 
A stronom ical U nit ( AU ) solar o rb it [21], about halfway betw een the  orbits of E arth  
and Venus. O rb it calculations have ind icated  th a t , th is  o rb it would rem ain  stable 
w ith  respect to E a rth  and Venus, for a t least one m illion years. Also, the energy 
required to  reach this solar o rb it, is lower th an  th a t  required  for solar system  escape 
and significantly lower th an  th a t  needed to  reach the  S un’s surface.
A typical system  plan would include fabrication of th e  appropria te  waste form  into  a 
spherical payload shape, loaded in to  a stainless steel container and packaged in to  a 
flight weight rad iation  shield. T his is transferred  to  th e  launch  site  and stored till a 
nuclear w aste payload is assem bled. Essentially, the  payload is proposed to  com prise 
of the  waste, a R e-entry Vehicle ( RV ) s truc tu ra lly  supporting  the  waste, th e  O rbit 
T ransfer Vehicle ( OTV ) for boosting the  payload to  escape from  the  low earth  orbit 
and inserting it into a  heliocentric transfer tra jec to ry  and th e  Solar O rbit Insertion 
Stage ( SOIS ) for placing the  w aste payload into a circular solar o rb it. The shu ttle  
would be launched at a 108° south  az im uth  to  a  300 K m  circular o rb it, inclined a t 38° 
to  the  equator. Once in o rb it, the  payload would be deployed and the  O TV  would 
be used to  escape from the low E arth  orb it and place the  SOIS and the waste, on 
a heliocentric transfer tra jec to ry  to  achieve a 0.85 AU circular o rb it, inclined a t 1° 
to the  ellip tic  plane. Following th e  heliocentric transfer tra jec to ry , the  O TV  would
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Figure A .2: F ligh t System  P lan for Achieving a H eliocentric O rbit, Source W. Perlich, 
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be separa ted  from  th e  SOIS and waste payload, re tro  th ru sted  back into a low earth  
o rb it, installed  in th e  o rb ite r and deorbited  to  E a rth  for refurbishm ent and reuse. 
T he SOIS would deploy th e  waste into th e  final solar o rb it. A typical flight system  
plan would be, as dep icted  in fig. 3.6. T hough, e laborate  and expensive to  achieve, 
this schem e would be th e  m ost acceptable, due its  stability .
A .2.2 Lunar E m p la cem en t/O rb it
T his option  would involve the  deploym ent of th e  w aste payload, into a lunar orbit 
and possible, subsequent lunar landing and em placem ent. T his schem e would be the 
m ost a ttrac tiv e , in term s of cost. Also, previous m anned m issions to this destination, 
should help in devising a fairly robust disposal strategy. However, the potential
for scientific and public controversy is high. One m ajor concern is the long term  
stability  of a  lunar o rb it, as the dom ain of operation of such an orb it would be very 
lim ited when orbital variations are accounted for. This option has not been discarded 
com pletely from  consideration, in sp ite  of the  above m entioned disadvantages, as it 
is still a ttrac tiv e , in the  light of its low cost.
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